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IMPLICATIONS OF DNA TECHNOLOGY
ON POSTHUMOUS PATERNITY
DETERMINATION: DECIDING THE
FACTS WHEN DADDY CAN'T GIVE HIS
OPINION
Paternity practice has suffered from the old saw to the effect that
"maternity is a matter of fact whereas paternity is a matter of
opinion."'
In twelfth-century Japan, a person claiming to be an heir of the
deceased pricked his or her finger and caused a drop of blood to drip
on the deceased's skeleton.' Paternity was established if the bones
absorbed the blood.6 If the putative father was still alive, the parties
combined drops of their blood in a basin and paternity was established
if the drops merged. 4 Folklore such as this, and other primitive meth-
ods used until the early part of this century, were fifty percent accurate,
at best." Increasingly sophisticated scientific tests developed during the
last few decades, however, have raised the probability of excluding a
falsely accused man to over ninety percent, greatly reducing the risk
of undetected fraudulent claims. 6
Modern scientific paternity tests examine putative fathers for the
genetic traits required of the biological father.? If a candidate lacks
genetic traits that must be present in the child's biological father, he
is absolutely excluded from paternity. 8 The presence of identical traits
in both child and putative father is not, however, absolute proof of
paternity, because each of the tested traits occurs in a large subgroup
of the population.' Thus, a "paternity index" is calculated using knowl-
I HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY Law 934 (3d ed. 1990).
2 Scientific Thsting for Paternity Establishment, in Balm:11,1u AND DEFENDING CONTESTED PA-
TERNITY CASES: PRACTICING UNDER G.L. CHAPTER 209C 91 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. ed., 1989).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6
"Steven R. Lake & Mary D. Paulsen, From Here to Paternity, FAM. Anvoc. 40,41-42 (Summer
1985).
8 Id. at 42.
See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of why identical traits do not
necessarily prove paternity.
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edge of how frequently different traits occur in the general population,
and the use of probability statistics.'° This is a measure of the prob-
ability that the alleged father, rather than a randomly selected male, is
the child's biological father."
Early scientific paternity testing examined blood samples for char-
acteristics such as blood group and enzyme types caused by an individ-
ual's underlying genetic traits.' 2 These methods cannot be used to
determine the veracity of posthumous paternity claims because blood
is discarded during embalming and is therefore unavailable for tests. 13
The recently introduced deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") tests go be-
yond measuring characteristics present in a person's blood to examine
the DNA molecules that contain the codes for all of an individual's
physical traits," Because DNA is present in almost all human cells and
may remain unchanged long after an individual's death, this new
technology creates the promise of accurate paternity determination
long after a putative father is dead and buried. 15 DNA testing often
produces paternity indices well above 99.99%—as near to an absolute
determination of paternity as is possible.'°
Courts considering paternity claims generally are concerned with
problems of proof and the risk of fraudulent claims.' 7 Consequently,
10 Lake & Paulson, supra note 7, at 42-43.
11 Id at 92.
12 See Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 92-93.
"'Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22, 1993).
14
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 1 (1992).
15 Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Baird, Lifecodes Corporation (Jan. 22, 1993); PAUL
C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. INSWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 113 (Michie Supp. 1992). For
example, in April 1992, the press reported that British scientists had identified the body of a man
who had drowned and been buried in Brazil, in 1979, as that of Waffen-SS officer Josef Mengele.
Steve Connor Sc Michael Sheridan, British Scientists End the Long Search for Josef Mengele, THE
INDEPx.xnKsrr, Apr. 5, 1992, at 10. The scientists identified the body by a comparison of deoxyri-
bonucleic acid ("DNA") found in a few slivers of bone from the exhumed skeleton and blood
samples from Mengele's wife and only living son. Id In addition to tissue samples from an
exhumed body, DNA testing may be performed on samples taken during biopsy or autopsy
procedures, or from living blood relatives of the deceased. Telephone Interview with Jennifer
Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22, 1993); see infra notes 114-18 and accompanying
text for a discussion of various sources that may be used for DNA testing.
111 See CELLMARK DIAGNOSTICS, DNA FINGERPRINTINGs" AND DNA PROFILING 8 (1989).
17 See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978) ("[b]ecause of particular problems of proof
[with posthumous paternity claims], spurious claims may be difficult to expose"); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) ("the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity");
In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749, 755 (Pa. Super. CO ("proof problems have always been
on forefront of counseling against condoning an illegitimate's claim"), appeal denied, 600 A.2d
953, appeal denied sub nom. Petition of Greenwood, 600 A.2d 954 (Pa. 1991).
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courts have restricted the ability of illegitimate children"' to bring
paternity suits, especially after the death of the alleged father. 19 This
Note argues that advances in DNA testing technology render obsolete
many traditional fears regarding posthumous paternity testing, thereby
removing the underpinnings of most related legislation and court
decisions. Section I discusses the rights of illegitimate children to
establish paternity so as to inherit and to receive benefits under various
government programs. 2° Section Il explores the potential of DNA test-
ing.21 Section III discusses recent cases involving DNA testing in post-
humous paternity disputes. 22 Section IV discusses the legal implications
of this new ability to make accurate posthumous paternity determina-
tions, and proposes changes to the Uniform Parentage Act and Uni-
form Act on Paternity to reflect the new reality."
ig The ways in which society refers to those burn out of wedlock have changed significantly
over time, reflecting society's evolving attitudes toward such children. See Greenwood, 587 A.2d at
751 n.l. Under common law, children born out of wedlock were "bastards" and suits against
putative fathers to obtain support, if allowed, were called "bastardy proceedings." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 152 (6th ed. 1990). Later, the term "illegitimate children" was used to refer to those
born out of wedlock. Id. at 747-48. This was subsequently replaced with "children born out of
wedlock," Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 751 11.1. Today, the less pejorative phrase "children without
presumed biological fathers" is the preferred reference to those born out of wedlock. Interview
with Gerald Beyer, Visiting Professor, Boston College Law School, in Newton, Mass. (Apr. 13,
1993), It reflects the fact that, absent marriage, there is no individual who is presumed to have
flithered a child. Id. Several uniform acts no longer make any distinction between "legitimate"
and "illegitimate children," focusing instead on the parent and child relationship. See, e.g.,
UNIFORM PRORATE CODE § 2-114 (1991) ("an individual is the child of his [or her] natural
parents, regardless of their marital status"). Despite the move toward a more neutral term,
however, most statutes and courts still use the phrase "illegitimate children." This Note uses the
term "illegitimate" for consistency with the laws and cases discussed.
19 English common law courts refused to hear paternity claims, because an illegitimate child
lacked the right to bring such an action, even while his or her alleged father was living. See 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *959. As the law changed, reflecting society's evolving
attitude toward illegitimate children, other concerns continued to inhibit courts from considering
paternity claims after the putative father's death. See, e.g., Lai, 439 U.S. at 267,268,275-76 (state
requirement of filiation decree as only way of establishing paternity jtastified by particular prob-
lems of proof after putative father's death); Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1510, 1314
(Franklin County, Ohio C.P. 1988), dismissed as moot, 560 N.E.2d 1337,1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
("[M]ost case law, as well as statutes, provided that inheritance by an illegitimate child from his
[or her] father could only be effected if the father publicly acknowledged that he was in fact the
father of the illegitimate child.").
2u See infra notes 24-79 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 80-119 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 120-287 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 288-352 and accompanying text.
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1. RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO INHERITANCE AND
BENEFITS BASED ON PARENTAL STATUS
legitimate children are not "nonpersons." They are humans,
live, and have their being."
Under English common law, an illegitimate child was filius nullius,
the child of no one.25
 The child could not inherit from anyone, nor
could the child have heirs other than those of his or her own body. 26
Moreover, an illegitimate child had no right to support from his or her
parents and even subsequent marriage by the parents could not render
the child legitimate. 27
Although these common law rules were at first carried over to the
United States, by the early 1900s most states allowed an illegitimate
child to inherit from his or her mother by intestate succession. 28
 Many
states, however, continued to impose restrictions on the child's right
to inherit by intestate succession through the mother, from her rela-
tives. 29
 Moreover, most states did not allow the illegitimate child to
inherit by intestate succession from or through his or her father."
Today, an illegitimate child who establishes his or her father's
paternity is entitled to rights similar to those of children born in
wedlock. 31
 For example, the child may be entitled to some level of
support from the father." In addition, if the father is deceased, the
child may have the right to intestate paternal inheritance depending
24 Levy  V. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1967).
25 I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459. "[Hie cannot be heir to any one, neither
can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filitts. . ." kl.
26 hi .[Hie is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable
blood can be derived." Id.
27 a at *455-56, 459,
24 Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Franklin County, Ohio C.P. 1988); Note,
The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARI/. L. REV. 337, 337 (1962).
29
 See Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 337.
30
 id. A broader exception to the rule of filius nullius was found in Connecticut, which
allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from both of his or her parents. See Heath v. White, 5
Conn. 228, 233-34 (1824), By the early 1960s, a minority of states allowed an illegitimate child
to inherit by or through his or her father, but almost all of these had statutes requiring a
prior written acknowledgment of the child by the father. Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at
337.
31
 See Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mimi. L. REV. 477, 478-82
(1967). Modern statutes still disfavoring illegitimate children fall into five categories: support;
inheritance; custody, visitation and adoption; father's name; and state and federal welfare laws.
Id. at 477-80. This Note does not discuss support, custody, visitations or adoption restrictions, as
these are immaterial once the father dies. Nor is the right to use the father's name discussed, as
advances in DNA technology do riot affect this issue.
92 See Krause, supra note 31, at 478. Most states make the father responsible for the support
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upon the laws of the state in which the father lived." The child also
may qualify as a member of the beneficiary class if the father's will
leaves property to his "children" and may qualify as a pretermitted heir
if he or she is not mentioned in the father's will. 34
An illegitimate child also may qualify for benefits under state and
federal welfare statutes that tie a child's eligibility to the existence of
a father covered by the legislation in question." Federal statutes use
several methods to determine the benefit rights of illegitimate chil-
dren." For example, statutes may contain explicit provisions defining
the conditions under which illegitimate children receive benefits."
These conditions may include an allowance for paternity determina-
tion after the father's death, although others require the father's ac-
knowledgment of the child." Rather than make explicit provisions, at
least one statute, the Social Security Act, defers to state law by defining
"natural child" according to "such law as would be applied in deter-
mining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts
of his illegitimate children. Id. The level of support is often left to the court's discretion, and
legitimate children may receive higher levels of support, for longer durations. Id.
9;1 Note, The Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children in Georgia: The. Role of a Judicial
Determination of Paternity, 16 GA. L. Rev. 170,186-88 & nn.114-18 (1981); see, e.g., COLO. REV.
S'I'AT. § 15-11-109 (b)(11) (1987) (inheritance by illegitimate child allowed where paternity proven
by a preponderance of the evidence); DEE. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(2)(h) (1987) (same); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109 (Michie 1989) (same); el 11.1.. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110 1/2, para. 2-2(h)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (inheritance by illegitimate child requires acknowledgment, adjudica-
tion ofpaternity, or clear and convincing evidence of paternity); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2) (ii)
(1989) (inheritance by illegitimate child requires adjudication before father's death or strict, clear
and convincing proof of paternity).
54 A class gift is the gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons possibly uncertain in number
at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, who all take shares dependent upon
the ultimate number of class members. BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 249 (6th ed. 1990). A preter-
mitted child is one the testator unintentionally fails to mention in his will, who is either living on
the date of will execution or born thereafter. Id. at 1187. State pretermission statutes commonly
provide that such a child takes the same share of the estate which he or she would have taken if
the testator had died intestate. Id.
" Krause, supra note 31, at 480. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the eligibility of illegitimate children under federal welfare statutes.
36
 See generally Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 339-53.
37 See id. at 339-40.
38
 For example, "child" is defined by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
At to include an "acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased," 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(14) (1988). Thus, an unacknowledged child bringing a claim after the putative father's
death is deprived of two reliable sources of evidence: the father's testimony and scientific paternity
tests. See Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 339. Similarly, an illegitimate child is eligible for
some benefits under the Veterans' Administration Act on the death of his or her father if the
child has been acknowledged in writing, if paternity has been adjudicated, if the father has been
judicially ordered to contribute to the child's support, or if' the administrator is convinced there
is evidence to establish paternity. 38 U.S.C. § 101(4) (A) (1988).
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of the state in which the insured individual is domiciled."" Finally,
some federal benefits statutes make no specific provisions regarding
the rights of illegitimate children, leading courts to create a federal
rule governing the rights of illegitimate children when interpreting
some statutes and to rely on state intestacy provisions for other stat-
utes.°
69 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2)(A) (1988). One commentator suggests this choice was apparently
based on Congress's desire to respect'state domestic relations policies. Rights of Illegitimates, supra
note 28, at 341. Some states, however, deny or limit the illegitimate's right of inheritance from
his or her father, but impose full support requirements on living fathers of illegitimate children.
Id. at 341. Thus, the act's goal of providing benefits for dependents of the insured, a goal
consistent with that of these states, may be frustrated by reliance on intestate succession laws
to determine eligibility because these laws often prove insurmountable hurdles to illegitimate
children seeking to prove paternity. Id.
4° See Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 341-42. Courts that viewed statutes as providing
benefits other than compensation for the loss of the deceased have relied on state intestacy
provisions to define the rights of illegitimate children. See id. at 342-44. For example, the
Copyright Act provides that the copyright holder's right of renewal may be exercised by the widow,
widower or children. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). The United States Supreme Court interpreted
the definition of children as a question of the descent of property that should be controlled by
the child's status under state law. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S, 570, 582 (1956). Similarly,
insurance benefits are paid under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act to, in order
of preference, the beneficiary, the deceased's spouse, the deceased's children and their descen-
dants by representation, and others. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) (1988). Courts have held that whether
illegitimate children are included in the definition of children is controlled by state intestacy
succession laws. See Brantley v. Skeens, 266 F.2d 447, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1959); La Bove v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 264 F.2d 233, 234-35 (3d Cir. 1959); Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 343.
One commentator has suggested that courts that have relied on state laws presumably reasoned
that a child not receiving support from his or her father did not need or deserve the right to the
father's benefits created under the programs. See. Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 343. On
the other hand, some courts that perceived other statutes as providing compensation for actual
pecuniary loss suffered by a beneficiary have established a federal rule to govern the rights of
illegitimate children. Id. at 344-45. For example, the Federal Death on the High Seas Act provides
compensation for the "actual pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent's wife, husband, parent,
[or] ..." 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988). In Middleton a Luchenbach S.S. Co., the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that uniform treatment of children from different states
whose parents were killed in the same maritime accident required a uniform federal definition
of children that included illegitimates. 70 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934).
One commentator has suggested there was no justification for treating illegitimate children
differently, because the statute's purpose was to provide compensation to those who have lost
support, the inclusion of illegitimate children would not deprive other relatives of benefits and
Congress expressed no preference, See Rights of Illegitimates, supra note 28, at 346. Courts have
also interpreted the Jones Act, which provides a right of action for death of railway employees,
as requiring a federal definition of children that includes illegitimates. See, e.g., Civil v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954); see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); Rights of Illegitimates,
supra note 28, at 346-48. The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides a cause of action to
employees of railroad common carriers for injury or death which survives for the benefit of an
employee's spouse or children, and courts have deferred to state law for the definition of children
under the act. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 59 (1988); Bowen v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 179 F. Supp. 225, 226-27
(D. Mass, 1959); Padgett v. Padgett, 88 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (S.D. Fla. 1950).
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In addition to the federal restrictions on the rights of illegitimate
children, some states impose a high burden of proof on children
seeking to prove their fathers' paternity:u Although many states treat
paternity determination as a civil matter, requiring proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, other states still reflect the criminal roots of
paternity establishment and require clear and convincing evidence
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Many statutes have long made
it impossible for children to establish paternity after their fathers'
deaths, especially for intestate inheritance purposes." Where posthu-
41
 See infra note 44 for a discussion of the burdens of proof imposed on children seeking to
prove their father's paternity. Until recently, case law and state statutes made it almost impossible
fbr an illegitimate child to legally establish paternity without the father's cooperation. See Alex-
ander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Franklin Co u nty, Ohio C.P. 1988).
42 See Victoria S. Williams & Robert G. Williams, Identifying Daddy, THE juDGEs' JouRNAL 2,
4 (Summer 1989); Carol D. Browning, Note, The Burden of Proof in a Paternity Action, '25J. FAM.
L. 357, 364-68 (1987). Similarly, the standard for rebutting a presumption of paternity, such as
that which accompanies the birth of a child to a married woman, is usually higher than the
standard for proving paternity. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4(b), 14(a) (19'73) (an
action tinder this act is a civil action; presumption must be rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence).
43 See Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1312. Most statutes and case law provided that inheritance
by an illegitimate child required public acknowledgment by the father that he was, in fact, the
child's father. Id. This acknowledgment typically bad to be a notarized writing or "open and
notorious" or otherwise requiring an affirmative act by the father that was unobtainable after the
putative father's death. See id. Several states still impose restrictions on an illegitimate child's
ability to prove paternity and qualify for intestate succession from the putative father's estate that
often effectively bar such an action. See, e.g., GA. ConE ANN. § 53-4-4(c) (Michie Supp. 1992)
(clear and convincing evidence of paternity and of father's intent for child to inherit); LA. Qv.
CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952) (paternity must have been duly acknowledged and father must
have no descendants, ascendants, collateral relatives or wife); MASS. GEN, LAWS ANN. ch . 190, § 7
(West 1990) (action [oust be brought against administrator or executor); N.Y. EsT. Pow•ks &
TRUSTS LAW, § 4-1.2(2) (McKinney Stipp. 1993) (requires adjudication during father's lifetime,
clear and convincing evidence of open and notorious acknowledgment or that blood genetic tests
had been performed during lifetime); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) (1984) (no action begun or
adjudication made after putative father's (heath); Ott. REV. STAT. § 112.105(2) (1987) (paternity
established during father's lifetime or written acknowledgment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 29-1-15.1 (Michie Stipp. 1992) (requires marriage cif parents, written acknowledgment, adjudi-
cation during father's life or clear and convincing evidence prior to estate settlement); VT. STAT.
ANN. DI 14, §§ 553, 554 (1989) (paternity judicially declared during putative father's life, or
openly and notoriously acknowledged or intermarriage of parents); W. VA. ConE § 42-1-6 (1982)
(requires marriage of parents); Wis. STAT. ANN. g 852.05(i) (West 1991) (paternity adjudicated
during lifetime, admitted in open court or written acknowledgment). Some states also impose
time restrictions on the bringing of a paternity action for intestate succession following the
putative father's death. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28.9-209(a)(2) (d) (Michie 1987) (within 180
days); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7(6) (1)(B) (Burns 1989) (within five months); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-109 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (within eight months of death or six months of estate
probate); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15.1 (Michie Stipp. 1992) (prior to estate settlement).
While these restrictions are imposed for purposes of qualifying for intestate succession, they also
have the effect of denying access to benefit programs, such as Social Security, which base eligibility
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mous claims were allowed, the requirements of proof varied widely
between the states: Even though many states treat proof of paternity
as a civil matter, the burden of proof in proving paternity is usually
higher after the putative father has died. 45
Recently, the drafters of several proposed uniform acts have in-
cluded provisions to ease the burdens the law places on illegitimate
children. The Uniform Probate Code provides that children may take
by intestate succession from their parents regardless of whether the
parents were married. 46 The Uniform Act on Paternity includes provi-
upon qualification for descent of property from the father under state law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(2)(A) (1988).
44 See Inheritance Rights, supra note 33, at 186-89 nn.112-18, Some states require proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 15-11-109(b) (II) (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 508 (2)(6)(1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2.109(B)(3) (Michie 1989). Other states
require proof by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045(2)(1985);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109(2) (b) (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2309(2)(ii) (1989) (strict,
clear and convincing proof). Finally, some states impose even higher burdens of proof. See, e.g.,
Arm COM: ANN. § 28-9-209(d) (Michie 1987) (acknowledgment includes written acknow-
ledgment, consent to name appearing on the child's birth certificate, or a voluntary promise
to support the child); CONN. G. STAT. § 45a-438(b)(2)(B) (West 1993) (prior adjudication, ac-
knowledgment in writing and under oath or clear and convincing evidence of both written
acknowledgment and openly treating child as own); toms, CODE ANN. § 633.222 (West 1992)
(general and notorious or written acknowledgment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(6)(2) (1984)
(acknowledgment must be in writing before a certifying officer, and filed with clerk of superior
court).
45 See Browning, supra note 42, at 360, 363. The majority of states use a preponderance of
the evidence standard for paternity actions brought during the putative father's lifetime, while
posthumous actions often require clear and convincing evidence. id; see, e.g., Ara. ConE § 43-8-
48(2)(b) (1991) (clear and convincing evidence for posthumous actions); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11.045 (1985) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (2) (b) (1975) (same); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-4-4(c) (1) (E) (Michie Stipp. 1992) (clear and convincing evidence that father intended child
to share in estate); IDAHO Com; § 15-2-109(b) (2) (1979) (clear and convincing evidence); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (same); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 91-1-15(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060(2)(2) (Vernon 1992)
(same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2) (1989) (strict, clear and convincing proof); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 561:4(11) (Butterworth Supp. 1992) (clear and convincing evidence); N.Y. Es'r. PowEits
& TRUSTS Law § 4-1.2 (a) (2) (B) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (clear and convincing evidence of open
and notorious acknowledgment or blood genetic tests had proven paternity); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN., § 2107(c) (1992) (clear and convincing evidence); R.I. GEN. Laws § 15-8-8 (1988) (same);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15.1
(Michie Supp. 1992) (same, prior to estate settlement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(2) (B) (Supp.
1992) (clear arid convincing evidence); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-109(2) (b) (1993) (same),
46 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-114(a) (1990). The relevant section reads in part:
(a) [flor the purposes of intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an
individual is the child of his [or her) natural parents, regardless of their marital
status. The parent and child relationship may be established under [the Uniform
Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory reference].
Id.
May 1994]	 POSTHUMOUS PATERNITY DETERMINATION 	 755
sions equating the responsibilities of fathers of illegitimate children
with those of fathers of legitimate children."' The Uniform Parentage
Act contains similar provisions." The provisions of these acts regarding
proof of paternity, however, generally assume that the putative father
is alive and a party to the action."`' They do not include provisions for
testing parties other than the mother, child and putative father. 5° The
modern trend is toward treating children equally, regardless of their
parents' marital status, but fails to recognize the utility of performing
blood or DNA tests on collateral persons.
One state, Minnesota, has realized the efficacy of testing persons
other than the mother, child and putative father and enacted a law in
1983 providing for testing relatives of a deceased putative father. 51 In
1987, in Voss v. Duerscherl ("Voss 1'), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
held that a deceased putative father's relatives were proper parties to
a paternity action and that ordering them to submit to blood tests did
not violate state or federal constitutional rights to due process and
47 UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY § 1 (1960). The relevant part reads:
The father of a child which is or may he born out of wedlock is liable to the same
extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born
alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and
for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses or the child. A child
born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband.
Id
45
 UNIFORM PARENTAGE Act' §§ 1,2 (1973) The relevant section reads in part:
As used in this Act, "parent and child relationship" means the legal relationship
existing between a child and his natural parents incident to which the law confers
or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and
child relationship and the fitther and child relationship.
Id. at § 1. Section 2 provides that, "Mlle parent and child relationship extends equally to every
child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. at § 2.
49 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE Ac'r §,§ 9, II (1973); UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY § 7
(1960).
5° See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT' § 11 (1973); UNIFORM ACT UN PATERNITY § 7 (1960).
51 Minnesota law provides that:
If the alleged father is dead, the court may, and upon request of a party shall,
require the decedent's parents or brothers and sisters or both to submit to blood
tests. However, in a case involving these relatives of an alleged father, who is
deceased, the court may raise to order blood tests if the court makes an express
finding that submitting to the tests presents a danger to the health of one or more
of these relatives that outweighs the child's interest in having the tests performed.
Unless the person gives consent to the use, the results of any blood tests of the
decedent's parents, brothers or sisters may be used only to establish the right of
the child to public assistance including but not limited to social security and
veterans' benefits.
MINN. STATs. § 257.62(1) (1992).
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privacy.52
 The trial court had ordered the putative father to undergo
blood tests, but he died before his scheduled test. 53 A subsequent trial
court ordered the deceased's father, brother and sister to submit to
blood tests, and they appealed the order." In analyzing the constitu-
tionality of ordering the relatives to submit to testing, the court of
appeals considered four factors in a right-to-privacy balancing analysis:
1) the importance of the state's purpose in requiring the intrusion in
question; 2) the nature and seriousness of the intrusion; 3) whether
the state's purpose justified the intrusion; and 4) whether the means
adopted was proper and reasonable. 55
 The court reasoned that, with
respect to parties other than the putative father, these factors trans-
lated into: 1) the state's interests in accurate and efficient resolution
of paternity actions; in ensuring the proper allocation of public assis-
tance funds among county, state and federal agencies and in protecting
the child's interest in knowing the identity of his or her father; 2) a
limited form of intrusion into bodily integrity or privacy; 3) important
state interests that justified a minimal intrusion; and 4) means that
were proper, safe and reasonable. 56
 Thus, the appeals court held that
the deceased's father, brother and sister could be ordered to submit
to blood tests to determine if the deceased was the plaintiff's father.°
In 1988, however, in Voss v. Duerscherl ("Voss IF), the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the underlying paternity action had not
survived the putative father's death, due to the lack of any personal
representative for the deceased's estate, and that the action could not
be pursued against the deceased's father and siblings. 58 The supreme
court noted that the court of appeals had based its finding, in part, on
a previous decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota holding that
a paternity action for purposes of inheritance survived the putative
father's death when the personal representative of the deceased's es-
tate was substituted as defendant. 59 The Supreme Court of Minnesota
reasoned that expanding the survivability of posthumous paternity
52 408 N.W.2d 161, 165-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), reed on other grounds, 425 N.W.2d 828,
830-31 (Minn. 1988).
53 Voss, 425 N.W.2d at 162.
54
 M. at 162-63. The case involved three referees, nine trial courts and two appellate hearings
before the relatives were finally ordered to submit to blood testing by the third referee and ninth
trial court. Id. This order was then appealed. Id. at 163.
55
 M at 166-67.
M at 167.
57 .1d.
58 425 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1988) [hereinafter Voss Ill.
"Voss II, 425 N.W.2d at 830-31. In Voss II, however, the deceased's personal representative
was discharged before the trial court could make a paternity adjudication. Id. at 831.
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actions to include general paternity determinations could have conse-
quences concerning rights of inheritance from or through collateral
relatives, statutes banning prohibited marriages, claims related to ar-
tificial insemination or surrogate parentage and other equally serious
areas.° The Voss II court further reasoned that neither statutory nor
case law supported the magnitude of potential consequences that
would flow from allowing a general paternity action to survive against
the deceased's relatives, rather than only allowing inheritance actions
to survive against the deceased's personal representative."' The court
held that, despite the statute's clear provisions, the underlying pater-
nity action had not survived the discharge of the deceased's personal
representative and the trial court could not order blood testing of the
deceased's relatives."' It specifically noted that its decision made un-
necessary a discussion of the constitutionality of the statute allowing
the testing of a deceased putative father's relatives." Thus, the actual
utility of the law in posthumous paternity actions remains unclear."'
Despite the modern trends toward expanded rights for illegiti-
mate children and facilitation of posthumous paternity actions, there
are still those who oppose granting illegitimate children rights identi-
cal to those of their legitimate playmates. Supporters of increasing the
burdens of proof on illegitimate children have justified such statutes
in three ways. 65 First, treating illegitimate children differently has been
justified as discouraging behavior many people find immoral, such as
sexual relations outside of marriage.'i 6
 This rationale assumes potential
parents will be so.worried about the treatment facing their illegitimate
child after the parents' death that they will refrain from illicit con-
duct.° Punishing one class of individuals to create guilt in another
group, however, has been found both ineffective and lacking a legiti-
mate governmental purpose." The United States Supreme Court has
sold. at 830-31.
61 Id. at 831,
62 Id.
(13
 Id, at 831 n.10.
64 See Voss II, 425 N.W.2d at 831 n.10.
65 See Krause, supra note 31, at 489-95. Cultural bias against illegitimate children is so deeply
rooted that statutes affecting their rights usually do not include a legislative declaration of intent
or purpose. Id. at 489. One commentator has suggested the real motivation behind such laws was
that legislators, as men, wanted to limit their unintentional offspring's claims against them. See
id. at 499. Under this theory, claims of illegitimate mothers and children would have received
little counter balancing support. Id. Moreover, legitimate wives had an interest in denying any
illegitimate children's claims that would come at the expense of the legitimate family. Id,
66 Id. at 492.
"7 Id.
68 Id. at 492 & n.60. The ineffectiveness of legislation denying rights to illegitimate children
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held that denial of rights to illegitimate children based on their par-
ents' "morals," as a way of discouraging bringing children into the
world out of wedlock, was a form of invidious discrimination against
the children and clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause. 6°
Supporters of laws limiting the rights of illegitimate children also
claim that the discrimination protects the family by encouraging mar-
riage and by protecting the economic and social strength of existing
families. 70 They argue that removing the social stigma of giving birth
to an illegitimate child would destroy a major incentive for marriage. 7 '
Moreover, they contend that a family's economic strength would be
threatened by forcing legitimate children to share their fathers' wealth
with his illegitimate offspring. 72 Finally, they assert that the family's
social fabric would be threatened by compelling the wife to accept any
relationship with her husband's illegitimate child." As one commenta-
tor has noted, these arguments do not address cases in which children
bring actions following their fathers' deaths solely to qualify for state
or federal benefits. 74
The third and most common justification advanced for restric-
tions on posthumous claims of paternity is a fear of fraud, including
collusive suits and spurious claims." Although the United States Su-
as a way of discouraging nonmarital sexual relations is demonstrated by the fact that 27% of
births in the United States in 1989 were nonmarital. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL.
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 69 (112th ed. 1992). Furthermore, as one commen-
tator has noted, birth in wedlock is not foolproof evidence that "immoral" behavior has not
occurred. Krause, supra note 31, at 491. According to the Janus Report on Sexual Behavior, one
in four married women has had at least one extramarital experience. Jack Thomas, Let's Get
Physical, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1993, at 25.
69 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (Court struck down statute denying illegiti-
mate children right to recover for mother's wrongful death, as invidious); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 763, 770 (1977) (Court struck down statute allowing intestate succession from
mother, but not from father, because illegitimate children cannot affect parents' conduct nor
change their own status).
" See Krause, supra note 31, at 492-95.
71 See id. at 493. This argument is similar to the "morals" argument, and operates by punishing
one group to shame another into adopting desired behavior. See supra notes 66-69 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of disadvantaging illegitimate children to create guilt in their
parents.
72 Krause, supra note 31, at 494. As one commentator has noted, these statements are equally
applicable to the husband's legitimate children from a previous marriage—an increasingly com-
mon phenomenon in the United States. Id.
73 hi
74 See Rights of Illegitimate.s, supra note 28, at 353.
75 See Major David B. Howlett, Illegitimate Children and Military Benefits, 132 MIL. L. REV. 5,
15 (1991). Problems of proof, especially when the putative father is deceased, have long served
as the justification for distinctions between maternal and paternal intestate inheritance rights.
Inheritance Rights, supra note 33, at 171; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) ("the
lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity").
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preme Court has indicated that concerns over proof must be real, the
Court has upheld a statute discriminating against illegitimate children
as justified by this concern." On the other hand, the Court also has
used scientific advances in blood testing as the basis for striking down
statutes restricting paternity actions." Moreover, the Court has recog-
nized the right to use blood tests to determine paternity." Thus, ad-
vances in DNA-based paternity testing are causing a reconsideration of
historical assumptions about the problems of proof."
II, SCIENTIFIC PATERNITY TESTING
For paternity applications, the odds that two unrelated people
possess the same DNA band pattern have been calculated to be, on
average, 30 billion to 1. Given that th e Earth's population is about
5 billion people (only "2.5 billion males) it is impossible to be more
sure of a paternity determination with any other available 'test."
A. Traditional 13lood"Based Paternity Testing
Modern blood testing methods for paternity determination are
based on the scientific laws of heredity and long accepted genetic
711 Lalli v. l.alli , 439 U.S. 259, 262, 275-76 (1978) (statute requiring court order of filiation
during father's lifetime as predicate to .illegitimate child's intestate inheritance upheld as sub-
stantially related to state interest in avoiding particular problems of proof in posthumous pater-
nity determination); Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771 (problems of proof cannot be made into an
impenetrable harder to bar illegitimate child from inheriting).
"See Clark V. jeter, 486 U.S..456, 463 (1988).(six-year statute of.limitations not substantially
related to important state interest in.preventing fraudulent claims.given scientific advances in
blood testing); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1983) (two-year statute.of limitations not
substantially related to legitimate state interest in preventing fraudulent claims given scientific
advances in blood testing). Scientific advances - have also caused courts to strike down or modify
laws in other areas. For •a discussion of scientific advances undercutting the justification for
regulation of second-trimester abortions, restrictions on Medicaid nursing care and the common
law year-and-a-day rule—which made no one responsible for a•killing where death occurred that
long after the act, see Marcia E Shissler, Social Security—Paternity .Testing Turns-theDependenty
Requirement for Posthumous Illegitimate Children Into an Anachronism, 64 'Rev. 869,
877-78 & n.82 (1991). Shissler-diScusses.the denial of Social - SeCurity Act-survivor benefits.to an
illegitimate child whose father died before the child was - born, based on the failure to show actual
dependency, despite a blood test that established paternity to a 99.8% certainty. See id. at 883.
She argues that scientific advances have undercut the ratiunalebehind the support requirement,
rendering it anachronistic. See id. -
78 See Little v. Streater, 452 U:S.'1, 16A 7 (1981) (denying incarcerated defendatithlood
grouping test to defend - paternity action, due to inability to pay, violated .Due:Process - Clause).
79 See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 537-N.E.2d 1310, 1314.(Franklin Coutity,.Ohio C.P. t1988)
("[T]he law must keep pace with these [DNA testing] .developments."); see rds.o - -MINN.--STAT.
§ 257.62, subd. 1 (West 1992) (deceased's - relatives may be required to submit to blood tests now
available for posthumous paternity determination).
CELLMARK, sit/ira note 16,..a'.1. 8.
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principles. 81 An individual's physical characteristics are determined by
chromosomes inherited in equal shares from the mother and father. 82
These chromosomes contain genetic markers that determine all of an
individual's inherited characteristics." Blood tests to determine pater-
nity rely on the presence of these inherited and identifiable genetic
markers in human blood cells. 84
Traditional blood tests work on the principle of exclusion." The
genetic traits that must appear in the biological father's blood are
determined by subtracting the variations in genetic markers that occur
in the mother's blood from those present in the child's blood." If the
markers in the alleged father's blood do not fall into the required
range, he is excluded from paternity." If they match, he is not ex-
cluded, but this does not mean he is the actual father." Depending on
the test used, the percentage of the population excluded may vary
from less than sixty percent to over ninety-nine percent." Traditional
81 See Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 92.
82 David B. Jackson, DNA Fingerprinting and Proof of Paternity, 15 Earn. Law Rep. (BNA) 3007,
3007 (May 16, 1989). Most human cells contain 46 chromosomes, paired in 23 sets, with one
member of each set coming from each parent. See Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 92. The major
exceptions are sperm and ova, which contain only 23 chromosomes. See Jackson, supra, at 3007.
Thus, an embryo obtains a complete set of 46 chromosomes, half from each parent Id at
3007-08.
"Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 92. The basic principle of the Mendelian laws of
inheritance, named after the founding father of modern genetics, which control inheritance of
genetic traits, are: 1) a child cannot have a genetic trait, or marker, that is absent in both parents;
2) a child must inherit one half of each pair of genetic markers from each parent; 3) a child
cannot have a pair of identical genetic markers unless both parents have the same markers; 4) a
child must have a genetic marker if it is present as an identical pair in one parent, because the
parent contributes half of each of its genetic pairs to the child. Lake & Paulson, supra note 7, at
41.
" Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 92.
85 See id,
86 See id,
67 id.
"Id. Some markers have few possible Nulues and, thus, each value is very common in the
general population. For example, in the ABO blood type system, the frequency distribution is
approximately 40% type A, 14% type B, 3% type AB and 43% type 0. PAL I. G. GIANNELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 605 (1986). Failure to exclude an alleged father
with the type 0 blood required of the biological father merely means he is one of 43% of the
male population that could be the child's biological father. See id,
89 Since the discovery of ABO typing, at the beginning of this century, about 20 different
blood antigens have been identified for use in paternity tests. Lake & Paulson, supra note 7, at
41. Testing for all of these may still fail to exclude up to 40% of falsely accused men. Id. at 42.
Testing for enzymes and serum proteins found in red blood cells may fail to exclude 15-20% of
falsely accused men. See Scientific Testing, supra note 2, at 94. Even combining enzyme and serum
protein with antigen tests will still fail to exclude 4-11% of falsely accused men. See id Human
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blood tests are unavailable, however, when the putative father is de-
ceased because blood is discarded and replaced with embalming fluid
when the body is prepared for buria1. 9" Even if a blood sample is
available, there are serious reliability questions when blood tests are
performed on old samples. 91
B. DNA-Based Paternity Mang
DNA testing, on the other hand, has the potential to go beyond
exclusion to positive identification of the biological father. 92 Except for
identical twins, each person's DNA is unique." As current tests only
measure selected portions of DNA, two people could theoretically have
the same DNA fingerprint; estimates of that actually occurring, how-
ever, are as low as one in thirty billion." Thus, the high level of
exclusion possible with DNA tests can effectively identify a putative
father as the biological father. 95
Leukocyte Antigen (FILA) tests, which compare antigens found in white blood cells, may fail to
exclude up to 10% of falsely accused men, depending upon the rarity of the particular antigens
found. See id. at 94-95. A combined HLA and red blood cell antigen test may still fail to exclude
more than I% of falsely accused men. See id. In a city of 500,000 people, half of each sex, this
would still leave at. least. 2500 men whose innocence could not be proven if they were falsely
accused.
99 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22, 1993).
91 See GIANNI:U.1 & 1MWINKEL1 IED, supra note 88, at 585. FILA tests are unavailable because
they require live blood. Lake & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 42. HLA tests must be performed within
24 hours from the time the blood sample is drawn and the blood cannot be refrigerated before
testing. Id.
92 See Jackson, supra note 82, at 3012.
93 Id. at 3008.
"Id. at 3012. This figure, using Cellmark Diagnostic's test, was derived from a 1985 study of
20 unrelated Caucasians reported by Dr. Alec Jeffreys, the developer of the DNA fingerprinting
process. M. at 3011-12. A later study calculated the chance or identical DNA fingerprints for two
African-Americans at 1 in 1.4 billion and for two American Caucasians at 1 in 840 million. Id. at
3912. One court, in presenting a detailed summary of the test technique and statistical reliability,
reduced the ratios by a factor of 10 to eliminate any possibility that the genes being measured
were not constant in the population from generation to generation. See People v. Wesley, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643, 659 & n.26 (Albany County Ct. 1988). In a comprehensive study, Yale University
researchers analyzed DNA patterns of almost 7000 people, using databases of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and Lifecodes Corp., and conservatively estimated the odds that two people would
have matching DNA fingerprints at one in a million at best. Yale Scientists Find Odds of DNA
Match 1 in a Million, Reuters, Feb. 7, 1992, available in LEX1S, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
95 See Jackson, supra note 82, at 3007, 3012. Even with more conservative estimates, the
chance of a randomly selected man's genetic make-up matching the biological father's as closely
as the putative father would he 1 in 140 million for African-American and 1 in 84 million for
Caucasian American. hi at 3012. This exclusion rate is orders of magnitude better than possible
with other tests. See supra note 89 for a discussion of the exclusion limitations of other blood-
based tests.
762	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:747
DNA-based paternity testing relies on well-accepted principles of
cellular molecular biology." Found in the nuclei of every cell except
red blood cells, the DNA molecule is a "double helix" formed by two
strands of nucleotides, one from each parent, connected to form a
twisted ladder.''' DNA fingerprinting represents portions of a person's
DNA as "bar codes" that may be compared with those of other indi-
viduals." By comparing the DNA fingerprints of the child, mother and
putative father, it is possible to determine if the man could have
fathered the child."
The process of DNA fingerprinting is easily described, although
the actual procedure requires carefully controlled steps.'" DNA is first
extracted from blood or other tissues of the mother, child and putative
father. 10 ' Restriction enzymes are then used to cut the DNA into many
smaller fragments of various lengths. 1 r2 Some of the resulting frag-
96Jackson, supra note 82, at 3007. The theory underlying DNA is so well accepted that,
among informed scientists, dissenting points of view are "almost totally absent." William C.
Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification
Tests, 75 VA. L. Kim 45, 60-61 (1989). The fundamental premises of DNA testing are the
following: each individual, except identical twins, has unique DNA that does not vary from cell
to cell; an individual's DNA does not change during his or her lifetime; DNA's structure is a long
twisted ladder, or double helix, that can be disassembled by breaking the long chain into shorter
fragments or by "unzipping" the two sides of the ladder into single strands; and single strands
will only pair with complementary strands of a certain molecular pattern. Id. at 61-63.
97 CIANNELLt & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 88, at 603, 103 (Supp. 1991); Jackson, supra note
82, at 3007. A cell's chromosomes contain nucleic acids, including DNA, which are composed of
nucleotides. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3007. Nucleotides are strings of alternating sugars and
phosphates with bases attached to each sugar. See id. The six-foot long DNA molecule is composed
of about three billion base pairs connected in a unique pattern. Id.; GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 88, at 113 (Stipp. 1991).
"Jackson, supra note 82, at 3008. "DNA fingerprint" refers to a bar code representation of
portions of a person's DNA; it expresses the individualized nature of these bar codes, analogous
to the uniqueness of an individual's fingerprints.
99 Id
Im See Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 64. Molecular biologists have accepted and used
these procedures for many years. Id. at 68, 69, 71 & n.119, 72, 74, The process described here is
used by Celltnark and Lifecodes, the two pioneering companies in DNA testing for forensic and
paternity purposes. Id. at 64. A different approach, based on the same underlying scientific
principles, was developed by Cetus Corporation and is used by Forensic Science Associates. See
id. at 64, 76, 78 11.115.
1 " Jackson, supra note 82, at 3008.
192 Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 67. A restriction enzyme recognizes a specific
palindromic sequence of four to eight base pairs that occurs repeatedly throughout the DNA
molecule. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3008. Another method uses restriction enzymes called
single-locus probes that detect a DNA sequence located on a single chromosome. GELLMARK,
supra note 16, at 4. These will not uniquely identify an individual, since many people have the
same genetic characteristics. Id. Use of several single-locus probes and statistics showing what
percentage of the population shares the particular combination of genetic traits, may allow for
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ments are polymorphic, meaning they differ in length between indi-
viduals.m These fragments are sorted according to length on a slab of
agarose gam
 Next, the fragments are permanently affixed to a ny-
lon membrane."' Radioactive probes are then used to identify poly-
morphic segments amid the DNA fragments on the membrane.m° Fi-
nally, this membrane is placed on an X-ray film, exposing it and
producing a pattern of elongated blobs or bands known as a "DNA
fingerprint. " 107
Interpretation of the fingerprints is the final step in DNA-based
paternity testing:Os The bands in the child's DNA fingerprint that must
have come from the biological father are compared to those found in
the putative father's fingerprint.m The probability that two unrelated
identification where the detected traits vary widely in different people. Id. Single-locus probes
are more appropriate for Ibrensic purposes, while multi-locus probes are considered statistically
stronger Ihr paternity testing. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3011.
103 Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 64. There are patterns of repeated short base pair
sequences within the DNA molecule. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3009. The number of repetitions
of these sequences varies from person to person. Id. Thus, fragmenting two individuals' DNA at
the same sites produces different length fragments due to differences in the number of repeated
base pairs in the fragments. Id. Related individuals share some base pair repeat sequences,
producing identical length fragments which, in turn, produce identical patterns in their DNA
fingerprints. See id.
104 A solution containing the DNA fragments is placed in a slot at one end of a slab of agarose
gel. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3008. An electric current is applied across the gel, causing the
negatively charged DNA fragments to move toward the positive electrode, SeeThompson & Ford,
supra note 96, at 69. Shorter fragments move faster than longer fragments, producing parallel
rows across the gel ordered by fragment length. Id. In paternity testing, DNA samples from the
child, mother and putative father arc treated with the same restriction enzymes and distributed
in parallel rows on the gel, so the resulting patterns may be easily compared. Jackson, supra note
82, at 3008.
105jackson, supra note 82, at 3008-09. In a process known as "Southern blotting," after the
scientist who invented it, a nylon membrane is laid across the gel slab. M Capillary action carries
the DNA fragments and binds them to the membrane in the same positions they occupied in the
gel. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 71 & n.120. The double-stranded fragments are then
treated with a chemical which causes them to "unzip" into single strands. Id. at 7l.
108 Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 71. Probes are single strand segments of DNA that
only bind to specific DNA sites occurring in, or adjacent to, identified polymorphic regions. Id.
at 71 & n.122,
107 M. at 74; Jackson, supra note 82, at 3009. Each band's location indicates the length of a
particular polymorphic DNA fragment. Thompson & Ford, supra note 96, at 74. Because the
lengths of these segments vary between individuals, the positions of the hands on different
individuals also tend to differ. Id.
1 °8 See Jackson, supra note 82, at 3009-11.
109 Cm.1.ramtx, supra note 16, at 6-7, All the bands in a child's DNA fingerprint must be in
one or both of the biological parent's patterns, as the child's entire DNA sequence was provided
by its parents. See Lake & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 41. Bands in two specimens are parallel only
when the two DNA samples contain matching genetic material. Jackson, supra note 82, at 3009.
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individuals will share a single band is estimated at twenty-five percent.' 10
The more bands assigned to the biological father that match those of
the putative father, the lower the probability that anyone else could be
the child's father)" The probability of a random man having the same
band pattern as the biological father is often so small that if the
putative father's bands match there is almost no chance that he is not
the child's father."
DNA fingerprinting can establish paternity even when the putative
father is deceased because DNA testing uses molecules that remain
stable and testable long after death. 113
 For example, preserved blood
Eliminating those bands in the child's fingerprint also present in the mother's fingerprint leaves
a pattern of bands that must be present in the father's fingerprint. See id. If' these are not found
in the putative father's fingerprint then he is excluded from paternity. Id. If the bands match,
the child and man share certain identical genetic characteristics. Id. Usually, all the bands match,
or none do, according to CelImark Diagnostics, a commercial laboratory using the pioneering
techniques of Professor Alec Jeffreys. Id. at 3011.
CELLMARK, supra note 16, at 7.
111
 Id. As the table below shows, the more bands that match, the lower the probability of an
unrelated individual having the same pattern of bands:
Probability of
Number of
	
Unrelated Individual
Matching Bands
	
Having Same Bands
1	 1 in 4
2	 1 in 16
4	 1 in 250
8	 1 in 65,000
12	 1 in 17,000,000
16	 1 in 4,300,000,000
18	 1 in 68,000,000,000
Id. One or two (and in extremely rare instances three) unassigned bands may result from
mutations in inheritance. IS The presence of bands in the child's fingerprint not assigned to
either the mother or the putative father reduces the probability of the alleged father's paternity.
Id. at 7-8. For example, if 14 non-maternal bands are all found in the putative fattier, the
probability that an unrelated man has the same bands is 1 in 268,000,000. Id. at 8. If 14 of 15
non-maternal bands are found in the putative father, the probability of an unrelated man having
14 of the 15 bands is only 1 in 23,000,000. /d. This lower probability of a random match results
because there is more chance of randomly choosing 14 of 15 items than there is of choosing 14
out of 14. /d For a detailed discussion of probability calculations in determining paternity, using
HLA test probabilities, see D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of
Paternity Testing,  75 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1989).
JI 2 See CELLMARK, supra MAC 16, at 8.
113 See id. at 8; see, e.g., Body in Cambodia Identified as Missing Reporter, BOSTON SUNDAY
Gt.otiE, Jan. 17, 1993, at 7 (DNA tests identify body exhumed in 1992 in Cambodia as Welles
Hangen, NBC correspondent executed by Khmer Rouge in 1970); Nigel l-lawkes, DNA Test
Identifies Tsarina's hones, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 1992, at Home News section (DNA tests
identify bodies unearthed in eastern Russia in 1991 as members of Russian imperial family,
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or tissue samples from the deceased putative father may be used." 4
Other sources include pulled head hair with intact roots, fingernail
clippings, dried blood stains and biopsy samples."' Moreover, if sam-
ples of the putative father's DNA are unavailable, it may be possible to
reconstruct his DNA fingerprint by using samples from close rela-
tives."" With samples from both parents of the putative father, it is
possible to determine paternity with practically the same certainty as
if the man's DNA was available."? If the parents are deceased, samples
from the putative father's legitimate children and/or his siblings may
be sufficient to reconstruct the man's DNA fingerprint."' Thus, DNA
testing provides, for the first time, the potential for accurate posthu-
mous paternity identification.""
executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918); Steven Connor & Michael Sheridan, British Scientists End
the Long Search for Josef Mengele, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 5, 1992, at 10 (DNA tests
identify man who died and was buried in 1979 as Waffen-SS officer Josef Mengele).
114 CF.I.I.MA RS, supra note 16, at 8. Samples preserved in saline or by freezing are preferred;
formaldehyde preservation, common in embalming, appears to reduce testing accuracy. Tele-
phone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22, 1993). Tests on
exhumed males may fail to exclude up to 40% of the population, due to the degraded condition
of most corpses. Id. Cellmark Diagnostics does not perform tests on embalmed tissue due to
problems caused by formaldehyde. Telephone Interview with Karla Weaver, Cellmark Diagnostics
()an. 22, 1093). Lifecodes Corporation estimates that its RFLP testing is successful in only 20-25%
of exhumation cases. Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Baird, Lifecodes Corporation (Jan.
22, 1993).
"°Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22,
1993). Care must be exercised in using secondary sources such as hair to ensure the sample
actually came entirely from the deceased and is not contaminated by biological material from
other individuals. Id. Other sources for DNA analysis samples have included semen samples, an
aborted fetus in a rape case, bone marrow, amniotic fluid, tissue, tooth pulp, saliva, urine and
sweat. JoAnn Marie Longobardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National Data Base,
17 FORD] I AM thus, U. 323, 336-37 (1989).
I" CM. LINA RR, SUPTa note 16, at 8.
terhi
11B Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22,
1993).
119 See, e.g., Body in Cambodia Identified as Missing Reporter, BOSTON SUNDAY G1,011E,
January 17, 1993, at 7; Nigel Hawkes, DNA Test Identifies Tsarina's Bones, DIE TIMES (London),
December 11, 1992, at Home News section; Steven Connor & Michael Sheridan, British Scientists
End the Long Search forJosef Mengele, The iNDEPENDENT (London), April 5, 1992, at 10. The three
largest private DNA testing laboratories in the United States have all performed paternity tests
where the putative father was deceased. Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Baird, Lifecodes
Corporation (Jan. 22, 1993) (less than 10% of Lifecode's business involves deceased putative
fathers); Telephone Interview with Karla Weaver, Cellmark Diagnostics (Jan. 22, 1993) ("We do
it all the time"); Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Ian,
22, 1993) (rarely involving exhumed bodies).
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III. DNA-RELATED POSTHUMOUS PATERNITY CASES
The problems of proof which have been the basis of denying inheri-
tance rights to illegitimate children have been removed by the
advent of this new genetic [DNA] testing. Therefore, this court can
no longer be a participant in denying the opportunity to an
illegitimate child to prove his paternity. . . . 120
Courts have responded in several ways to the admissibility of DNA
test results to determine paternity after the putative father's death. 121
Where the cases involved directly testing the deceased's genetic mate-
rial, courts have generally upheld such testing unless barred from
doing so by a specific statute.' 22
 On the other hand, when the cases
have involved testing the deceased's relatives to determine the de-
ceased's DNA fingerprint, several courts have struggled to balance the
right of illegitimate children to prove paternity with the privacy inter-
ests of those to be tested.'" Under this balancing, some of the courts
have ordered testing based on either the court's own inherent powers
or a statutory interpretation.'" Other courts have found themselves
prevented from ordering DNA testing of third parties by statutes. 125
A. Testing the Deceased Putative Father's Genetic Material
The question of using DNA testing of a deceased putative. father's
genetic material to determine paternity has been one of first impres-
I"Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Franklin County, Ohio CP. 1988), dis-
missed as moot, 560 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
121 See, e.g., Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1902, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (DNA test results
could not be used under state statute); In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782, 783- (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (deceased's ex-wife Ordered to submit to DNA tests); Id. (exhumation for DNA
testing ordered).
12`.4 SeeBatcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810, 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (exhumation order for
DNA testing upheld); Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314 (exhumation ordered for DNA testing); In
re Estate aGreenwood, 587 A.2d 749, 757 (Pa. Super. CL 1991) (administratrix ordered to release
deceased's blood samples for DNA testing). But see Le. Fevre, 785 F..Supp. at 1402 (DNA results
inadmissible under statute requiring "open and notorious acknowledgment" as sole method of
proof of paternity).
123 See, e.g., Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577, 580 (S.D. Tex. 1991);
William M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106 (Cal. CL App. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Cal.
App. LEXIS 1322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied sub nom, Mohammed v. Superior Court of
County of Sacramento, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1163 (Cal. 1991); -In re Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
536, 539, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), review denied sub nom. Estate of Sanders v. Sanders, 1992 Cal.
LEXIS 1623 (Cal. 1992); Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So.2d 474, 476 (La. 1991), xert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 782.
124 see, e.g., Tipps, 768 F. Supp. at 580 (inherent power); Sudwischer, 589 So:2d at 476
(Lemmon, J. concurring) (statutory power); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 784 (inherent.power).
125 See, e.g., William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05 (statute only allows testing of mother, child
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sion for several courts. 126
 Some courts have ordered exhumations and
the release of blood and tissue samples of the deceased so that DNA
testing could be performed, noting that scientific advances have re-
moved the problems of proof that long barred posthumous paternity
actions: 27
 At least one court, however, has found itself constrained
from utilizing the power of DNA testing by statutes lacking provisions
for its use in posthumous paternity cases. 123
1. Testing Allowed
In 1988, in Alexander v. Alexander, the Court of Common Pleas for
Franklin County, Ohio upheld a probate court order for the exhuma-
tion of a putative father so that DNA paternity testing could be per-
formed. 129
 The plaintiff asked the court to order the exhumation of
the deceased to allow DNA testing to establish that the deceased was
the plaintiff's father: 3" The court noted that the accuracy and infalli-
bility of DNA tests had removed the substantial problems of proof in
posthumous paternity cases that had long served to deny illegitimate
children equal inheritance rights."' The court reasoned that it could
no longer deny the opportunity to illegitimate children to prove their
paternity and upheld an order for exhumation of the deceased's body
for DNA testing. 132
Seeking a declaration that he was the deceased's sole heir, the
plaintiff asked the deceased's relatives to sign an application for exhu-
mation of the deceased so a DNA test could be performed to establish
paternity.'" When the relatives refused to sign the application, the
plaintiff petitioned the probate court for an order to compel exhuma-
and father to prove paternity); Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d at 539, 545 (statute provides exclusive
methods for proving paternity).
126 see,
 e.g., Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1311; Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 751.
127 Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810, 815 (exhumation order upheld); Alexander, 537
N.E.2d at 1314 (exhumation ordered); Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 757 (samples ordered released).
128 See Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407.
129 5:17 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Franklin County, Ohio C.P. 1988), dismissed as moot, 560 N.E.2d
1337, 1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff moved for dismissal during appeal after settlement
was reached with estate of deceased putative father's uncle). Cf. Will of Janis, 600 N.Y.S.2d
416 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1993) (exhumation request by alleged nonmarital child denied based on lack
of provision in law for genetic testing after putative father's death, public policy against
exhumations and availability of "ample proof of the type customarily submitted to prove pater-
nity").
's° Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1311,
151 hi. at 1314.
132 id
I" Id. at 1311 . The deceased, David Summers, died destitute, but his estate was subject to a
considerable inheritance from the estate of Summers' uncle, Alfred A. Adams. Id
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Lion as part of civil discovery. 154 After a hearing, the probate court
granted the plaintiff's motion and ordered the Union Cemetery Asso-
ciation to exhume the remains of the deceased.'" The deceased's
relatives appealed the order to the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas.'"
The Alexander court viewed the matter as one of first impression,
involving developments in paternity testing methods used to establish
the rights of an illegitimate child.'s7 In reviewing the history of com-
mon law and statutory treatment of illegitimate children, the court
noted that problems of proof had frequently deprived such children
of the opportunity to prove paternity and to share in their fathers'
estates.'" The court found, however, that the accuracy and infallibility
of DNA tests mitigated these evidentiary problems and that there was
no longer any reason to deny illegitimate children the opportunity to
prove paternity after their fathers' deaths, and to share in their fathers'
estates.'" Thus, the Alexander court upheld the order for exhumation
so that posthumous DNA paternity tests could be performed.m
Similarly, in 1991, in In re Estate of Greenwood, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania upheld an order of the Orphans' Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas of Greene County instructing the administra-
trix of the deceased putative father's estate to authorize the release of
blood samples from the putative father held by a county coroner.m
The plaintiff had requested release of the samples for genetic testing
to determine whether she was the deceased's daughter. 142 The admin-
istratrix asserted that the plaintiff's claim was barred by a statute of
1 " Id
11t5 Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1311.
157 Id The court took judicial notice of the accuracy of DNA tests in proving paternity. ird.
138 Li at 1311-14.
139 Id. at 1311, 1314. The court reviewed United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme
Court decisions concerning the inheritance rights of illegitimate children, noting that problems
of proof in establishing paternity were often the basis for states' denying illegitimate children the
right to inherit equally with their legitimate counterparts. Id. at 1314.
1441 Alexander, 537 N,E.2d at 1314. After reaching a settlement relative to the estate of the
deceased's uncle, the plaintiff moved to dismiss his action seeking a determination that he was
the deceased's sole heir. Alexander v. Alexander, 560 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
The Court of Appeals of Ohio found that, once the Probate Court dismissed Alexander's case,
the order to exhume was moot. Id. In a concurring opinion, one judge expressed concern that
several issues of first impression were left unresolved, including a probate court's power to order
exhumation, the nature of restrictions placed upon parentage determinations under Ohio law,
and the restrictions on an illegitimate child's inheritance. Id. at 1339-40 (George, J., concurring).
t41 587 A.2d 749, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
112 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 750.
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limitations and by failure to comply with Pennsylvania's inheritance
statutes.'" The Greenwood court reviewed the language and intent of
Pennsylvania's support and probate statutes, and reasoned that the
legislature had intentionally not created a statute of limitations for
paternity actions brought to determine the right to inherit. 194 Thus,
the Greenwood court upheld the order directing the administratrix to
release the blood samples of her deceased husband for testing.'"
In Greenwood, the plaintiff notified the deceased's estate that she
was the deceased's illegitimate daughter and intended to claim an
intestate share of the estate. 146 The administratrix, wife of the deceased,
refused to accept the plaintiff's evidence, which included a birth cer-
tificate and affidavits of the decedent's family and friends attesting to
the deceased's acknowledgment that he was the plaintiff's lather. 197
The administratrix indicated the only evidence of paternity she would
accept was proof through blood testing.'"
When the plaintiff discovered that the Allegheny County Coroner
had blood and tissue samples of the decedent, the administratrix
refused to authorize release of the samples for paternity testing. 1 A9 After
oral arguments, the orphans' court ordered the administratrix to au-
thorize release of her husband's blood for genetic testing. 16" On appeal,
145 Id.
144 See id. at 751-54. The court first reviewed the development of laws regarding the right of
illegitimate children to inherit, from the common law filius nullius doctrine to a more recent
Pennsylvania law declaring a person born out of wedlock to be the "child of his mother hut. not
of his father" for purposes of inheritance. Id. at 751. Pennsylvania law did not allow illegitimate
children to inherit through or from their fathers until 1978. Id.
145 Id. at 757.
146 1d at 750.
147 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 750.
14g Id. Under Pennsylvania law, there are significant differences between the burden of proof
for paternity actions for support and for intestate succession, Id at 752,754. The burden of proof
for support actions is a "preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 754; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
4343(a) (1991). The standard for paternity actions to determine the right to inherit is "clear
and convincing evidence" that the man was the father of the child. Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 752;
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(c) (1992).
Hu Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 750. The plaintiff indicated the administratrix was initially coop-
erative, but did not respond to requests to obtain samples from the coroner's office, Id. The
coroner was holding the samples pending investigation into the cause of' the deceased's death.
Id.
I" Id. The orphans' court and the Greenwood court. both !build the question of whether an
orphans' court could order a blood test, at the request of an illegitimate child, after the death
of the alleged father to be one of first impression. Id. al 751. It is unclear exactly what testing
was to be performed. The orphans' court ordered the administratrix to "authorize release of the
decedent's blood sample fur genetic testing." Id. at 750. The Greenwood court discussed the
exclusionary power of Human Leucocyte Antigen (MLA) tests at some length. Id. at 755-56, URA
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the administratrix challenged the lower court's authority to order such
tests at the request of an illegitimate child after the death of the alleged
father.'" She asserted that an eighteen-year statute of limitations under
Pennsylvania's support statute barred the plaintiff from bringing the
action and that the plaintiff failed to meet any of the conditions
precedent to establishing her right to inherit as a child born out of
wedlock. 152
The Greenwood court found that there was no statute of limitations
for bringing a posthumous paternity action to determine rights of
inheritance.'" The court recognized that Pennsylvania's concern with
accurate, efficient and final disposition of decedents' property might
be jeopardized by posthumous paternity claims that were brought
after long delay or with little proof.'" The Greenwood court found that
the case before it posed no such danger.'" In addition, the court
found genetic testing was one way of furthering the public policy of
eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy.'" The Greenwood court upheld
the order instructing the administratrix to authorize the county coro-
ner to relinquish the blood samples of her deceased husband for
testing. t 57
tests, however, cannot be performed on blood samples more than 24 hours old or that have been
refrigerated. See Lake & Paulsen, supra note 7, at 43. DNA testing is the only scientific method
able to provide "clear and convincing" proof of paternity from blood or tissue samples of a
deceased putative father. See id. A local newspaper story indicated that DNA tests were to be
performed. Court Upholds Paternity Blood Test of Dead Man, UPI, Mar. 18, 1991, available in
LEX1S, Nexis Library, UPI File.
151
 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 751.
152 Id. at 750, 752.
155 Id. at 752-54. A claimant must bring an action for support within 18 years of the birth of
the child. Id. at 752; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4343(b) (1991). Pennsylvania law allows children
to inherit through or from their fathers under several circumstances, including where there
is clear and convincing evidence that the man was the father of the child, which the court
interpreted as evidencing legislative intent to allow posthumous paternity determinations. Id. at
751-52, 752 n.3 (emphasis added); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 (1992).
15.1 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 756.
155 Id. The plain tiff brought her action one month following the grant of Letters of Admini-
stration and provided considerable other evidence of paternity. Id. at 750, 757; cf. Matthew for
Butler v. Bowen, 640 F. Stipp. 886, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (testimonial evidence by plaintiff, her
daughter and decedent's brother did not achieve the level of strict proof required).
156 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 756. The court was particularly distressed by the fact that the
administratrix's brief conceded the value of blood tests, yet sought to withhold permission for
such tests to avoid having "clear and convincing" proof of paternity presented. Id. at 755-56. The
court characterized her as saying: "I will withhold evidence that may prove potentially beneficial
to the appellee and detrimental to me." Id. at 756. The court found that public policy was against
allowing such behavior. Id
157 /ti at 757.
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In 1992, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also upheld an
exhumation order for DNA testing to determine paternity in &acheldor
v. Boyd.'" The defendant had sought an exhumation order so that
DNA tests could be perlbrnried on the deceased to determine the
relationship, if any, between himself and the deceased.• The court
noted that DNA testing to determine parentage was established as a
reliable process, recognized under North Carolina law, and applicable
when the putative father is deceased." The court dissolved a stay on
exhumation, noting that further delay in exhuming the body could
reduce the likelihood of obtaining satisfactory tissue samples. '61
In Batcheldor, the defendant filed a complaint in superior court
seeking to determine his inheritance rights.' 62 Plaintiffs, alleged heirs
of the deceased, filed an action in superior court in response to the
defendant's allegation that he was the deceased son and entitled to
share in the estate.'" This caused the defendant to file a motion to
exhume the deceased's body for DNA testing to determine if there was
a relationship between the two.'''' The defendant sought to prove two
facts with such testing: that the man from whom his mother was
separated when he was born was not his biological father, and that the
deceased, whom his mother later married, was his father. 1 "5 After ex-
tensive discovery, the trial court found that good cause had been shown
to exhume the body of the deceased and ordered the requested exhu-
mation and DNA testing."'"
155 423 S.E.2d 810,815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1902), writ denied, stay denied, review denied, 426 S.E.2d
700 (N.C. 1993).
155 Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 81 1 .
1611 1d. at 812.
161 Id. at 815 .
162 See id. at 810.
"See id.
164 See Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 811.
165 See id at 813-14. The defendant. was born on September 16,1936 and no father's name
was shown on his birth certificate. Id. at 811. At the time of the defendant's birth, his mother was
separated from her husband, whom she married in August of 1935 and lived with until November
1935, Id. at 812. The deceased and the defendant's mother were married on December 22,1940.
Id. To inherit from the deceased's estate, the defendant first needed to overcome the presump-
tion under North Carolina law that the child of a married woman is her husband's child. Id. at
813. This would make him illegitimate, as a "child born to a married woman, but begotten by
one other than her husband." Id. Next, the defendant needed to show that he was fathered by
the deceased. Id. at 814. His mother's subsequent marriage to the deceased would then make
the defendant legitimate under North Carolina law, entitling him to inherit from the estate of
the deceased. Id. at 813-14. DNA tests showing the defendant to be the son of the deceased would
resolve both these issues at once. See id. at 814.
1611 See id. at 811-12. In addition to the facts outlined above, the defendant presented
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The plaintiff and other alleged heirs of the deceased then ob-
tained a stay of the exhumation order and appealed the superior
court's decision to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.' 67 The court
of appeals concluded that, with a proper foundation, DNA testing
could determine both the defendant's original illegitimacy and his
subsequent legitimation through the later marriage of his mother to
the deceased.' 68
 The court reasoned that DNA tests were just the latest
advance in the types of evidence that could be used to show illegitimacy.
or legitimacy.®
 The Batcheldar court adopted the lower court's - reason-
ing that the just and orderly disposition of a decedent's property was
a lawful state interest that outweighed the natural and proper respect
for the dead, once buried.'" Rejecting the argument that permitting
exhumation would lead to a flood of similar petitions by would-be
heirs, the Batchelder court held that the defendant had presented
substantial evidence to support his claim and that, in the face of such
evidence, the "floodgate" argument should not deter the court from
its search for the truth. 171 The Batchelder court upheld the trial court's
exhumation order and dissolved the stay of exhumation.'"
Several courts have found that the potential of DNA testing justified
ordering the testing of a deceased putative father's genetic material,
through exhumation or the other sample sources.'" They have rea-
soned that the accuracy and infallibility of the tests eliminate the
problems of proof that traditionally accompanied posthumous pater-
nity actions.'" Additionally, the ability to make accurate posthumous
determinations furthers the public policy of eliminating the stigma of
illegitimacy.'" Thus, these courts are ordering the DNA testing of
extensive evidence that the deceased had held him out to the community as his son and readily
admitted his paternity, and that other family members considered him to be the deceased's son.
Id. at 812.
167 Id
 at 812-13.
I f'8 See id. at 814.
11â]
 See Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d 810, at 813-14. The court reviewed the use of evidence of
impotency, racial differences, non-access and, finally, blood-grouping tests to show that a man
cannot he the father of his wile's child. Id. at 813. The court then concluded that North Carolina
law contemplated the advancement of scientific techniques and the use of new methods such as
DNA testing. Id. at 814.
17(1
 Id at 812.
171 See id. at 814.
172 See id at 815.
173 Balcheldor, 423 S.E.2d 810 at 813-14 (exhumation); Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d
1310,1314 (same); In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749,757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (coroner's
blood and tissue samples).
171
 See, e.g., Balcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 814-15; Alexander, 537 A.2d at 1314.
17''
	 587 A.2d at 756.
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deceased putative fathers' genetic material as they would order living
putative fathers to submit to blood tests. 17"
2. Statute Bars Use of Testing
At least one court has been forced to disregard results of DNA
tests performed prior to the putative father's death, because the tests
did not meet a statute's narrowly drawn requirements for posthumous
proof of paternity.' 77 In 1991, in Le Fevre v. Sullivan, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California found that DNA
testing could not be used to establish the requisite parent-child rela-
tionship for benefits under the Social Security Act.'" In support of her
application for insurance benefits, the plaintiff submitted the results
of DNA tests performed on the deceased prior to his death that showed
he was the plaintiffs father. 17" The court reasoned that DNA testing
that had shown the deceased to be the child's father might be relevant
to a state paternity adjudication, but that it was not sufficient to estab-
lish the "openly held out" relationship required under the Social Se-
curity Act.'" The court held the DNA results proving paternity were
irrelevant to the case, and found paternity had not been established
under California law."'
There was no provision in California law for the use of DNA
testing to provide presumptive proof of paternity."' The plaintiffs only
176 Bracheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 815; Alexander, 537 A.2d at 1314; Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 757.
177 Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 E Stipp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal, 1991).
17 '3 Id. An illegitimate child can establish entitlement to child's insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act in several specific ways, one of which is to prove entitlement to inherit from
the insured under the laws of the state of the insured's domicile. Id. at 1404 11.1; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(2)(A)-(C) (1988). Paternity, and the right to Social Security benefits, also may be
established where the insured and other parent entered into a marriage ceremony which, but
for a legal impediment, would have been a valid marriage; where the deceased individual
acknowledged paternity in writing; where a court decree found the insured to he the child's
parent before the insured's death; where a court ordered the insured to contribute to the child's
support because the insured was the child's parent; and where the insured was living with or
contributing to the support of the child at the time of death and there is satisfactory evidence of
paternity. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A)-(C) (1988).
179 Le Fevre, 785 E Supp. at 1404.
180 Id. at 1407.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1406. Under California law, a right to intestate succession depended upon the
existence of a proven parent and child relationship. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408 (West 1991). This
parent and child relationship could he established by an unrebutted presumption of paternity.
Le. Fevre, 785 F. Stipp. at 1405. Such a presumption could he established either by the father and
mother having been married within 300 days before the child's birth or the parents making an
attempt to marry in compliance with i he law even if the marriage was invalid due to a technicality.
Id. at 1405 n.3.
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way to prove paternity was by showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the putative father had openly held out the plaintiff as his child: 83
The court noted that the plaintiff could attempt to establish paternity
in state court and that, if successful, this would entitle the child to
insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.' 84
B. Testing the Genetic Material of Collateral Parties
The issue of testing collateral parties, such as a deceased's wife
and relatives, has presented courts with more complicated issues.'" For
example, the people needed for the tests have not always been parties
to the paternity actions as a result of divorce or the deceased's lack of
an estate: 86
 Some courts have ordered collateral parties to be tested
simply by exercising the courts' inherent powers: 87 Other courts have
looked to statutes, such as civil discovery rules, for ways to justify and
compel such testing: 88
 Conversely, some courts have found that a state
inheritance statute, written before the possibility of posthumous pater-
nity proof was envisioned, effectively prevented them from ordering or
using DNA test results.' 89
1. Courts' Inherent Powers Allow Testing
In 1990, in In re Estate of Rogers, the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey held that a trial court had the inherent
power to order a nonparty to submit to blood tests to determine if her
deceased ex-husband was the plaintiffs' father: 9° The deceased's ex-
183
 Le Fevre, 785 E. Supp. at 1406-07. Paternity actions were brought under California's
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act. Id at 1405. Any court order establishing paternity after
the putative father's death for intestate succession purposes, however, was required to be sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence that the father had openly and notoriously held out the
child as his own. Id, at 1406-07. The court found that statements by the deceased's widow, brother
and cousin that the child was the deceased's were not clear and convincing evidence of paternity.
Id. at 1403, 1407. The widow's statement was against interest because her child would have to
share insurance benefits with any illegitimate child found eligible for benefits. Id. at 1403 11.5.
184 Le Fevre, 785 F. Supp. at 1407.
185 See, e.g., William M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (Ct. App. 1990) (putative
grandparents could not be ordered to submit to tests); In re Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
536, 539, 545 (Ct. App. 1992) (legitimate children and their mothers could not be ordered to
submit to tests); Sudwischer v. Estate of Floffpauir, 589 So.2d 474, 476 (La. 1991) (legitimate
daughter ordered to submit to tests); In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782, 783-84 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (ex-wife ordered to submit to tests).
186 See, e.g., William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (lack of estate); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 783 (divorce).
187 See, e.g., Rogers, 583 A.2d at 784.
188
 See, e.g., Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 475.
188 See, e.g., William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 105; Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539, 545.
396 583 A.2d 782, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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wife, who was not a party to the paternity action, was ordered to submit
to a DNA fingerprint blood test to establish whether the decedent was
the plaintiffs' father.m She refused to comply and the order was chal-
lenged on appeal. 192 The Rogers court reasoned that, while New Jersey's
version of the Parentage Act does not provide for the testing of some-
one in the ex-wife's position, the trial court had the inherent power
to order anyone within its jurisdiction to submit to such tests when
needed to adjudicate a genuine issue before it.'" The court held the
ex-wife could be ordered to submit to DNA blood testing.'"
In Rogers, four plaintiffs brought an action seeking to determine
that the deceased was their father and that they were entitled to a share
of his estate, which was resisted by the deceased's four children by
marriage. 15 Conflicting testimonial evidence led the trial judge to
comment that, although the evidence favored the plaintiffs' claim, "it
can go either way."'"" The trial court then ordered the parties and their
mothers, who had both testified, to submit to DNA fingerprint blood
tests within fifteen days.' 97 When the deceased's ex-wife refused to
submit to blood tests, the court ordered her testimony stricken, but
did not impose sanctions on her.'" The trial court then found that
paternity had been established and the deceased's children by mar-
riage appealed.'"
On appeal, the Rogers court found there was no justification for a
finding of paternity based on an adverse inference drawn against the
defendants from the ex-wife's refusal to submit to blood tests. 20° It
noted that New Jersey law allowed a court to order the child, mother
or alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests, and that an
191 Rogers, 583 A.2d at 783. The ex-wile was not a party because she had no interest its the
deceased's estate due to their divorce. Id.
152 1d.
193 Id. at 784.
194 Id. at 784-85.
195 Id. at 783.
196 Rogers, 583 A.2d at 783. Plaintiffs were conceived after their mother had separated from
her husband, and while the deceased was married to and living with his future ex-wife. Id. Because
plaintiffs' mother was married when they were born, her husband was presumed to be their
natural father and "clear and convincing evidence" was required to rebut that presumption. Id.
197 Rogers, 583 A.2d at 783. Plaintiffs made a preliminary showing that the results of such
tests would establish whether the deceased was their father. Id. The judge rejected exhumation
of the deceased's body to obtain a tissue sample due to unchallenged evidence that the body was
too decomposed for such testing. Id. at 783 11,2.
199 Id. at 783.
199 Id. at 783, 784.
200 Id. at 784. In a decision described by the Rogers court as "not clear," the trial court scorned
to rest its paternity finding in part on an adverse inference it drew against the defendants from
the ex-wife's refusal to submit to blood tests. Id. at 783-84.
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adverse presumption could be drawn from refusal to submit to such
tests."' The ex-wife, however, was not a party to the action—no party
to the action had refused to submit to the tests. 202 The Rogers court
held the trial court erred if it drew an inference adverse to the defen-
dants from the ex-wife's refusal and remanded the matter to permit
the trial court to clarify what it had done 2 03
The court also reasoned that, although the Parentage Act sub-
jected only specified parties to court-ordered blood tests, a trial court
was not helpless in dealing with a nonparty witness who refused to
submit to blood or genetic tests."' Noting that it is well within a trial
court's "inherent power to call witnesses on its own initiative in the
quest for the truth," the Rogers court reasoned that, if a court had the
inherent power to require a nonparty to give testimony, it also had the
power to require a nonparty to give evidence in the form of a blood
sample.205 The court held the trial court had the inherent power to
order the ex-wife to submit to blood tests, and to use contempt or other
sanctions to coerce her compliance if it found the plaintiffs needed
the blood test results to meet their burden of proof in the underlying
paternity action. 206
201 Id. at 784.
202
 Rogers, 583 A.2(1 at 784.
203 Id.
204
2a5
	 The court noted that forcing a putative father to give a blood sample implicated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and that there must be an
articulable reason for suspecting the defendant is the father before such tests may be ordered.
Id. at 784-85. The court found the evidence on the record provided articulable reasons for
ordering the ex-wife to submit to blood testing. Id. at 785.
2151 1d. at 785. The trial court's finding of paternity was reversed and remanded for proceed-
ings consistent with the Rogers court opinion. Id. Conversely, in 1985, in Hibbs u Chandler, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's intermediate appellate court, held that the parents of the
deceased putative father could be required under state law to submit to blood tests if they were
parties to the paternity action, but not if they were merely witnesses. 684 S.W.2d 310,313-14 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1985). The deceased died intestate and no personal representative was ever appointed.
Id. at 311. The paternity action was brought for the sole purpose of obtaining social security
benefits on behalf of a child against the deceased's account. Id Kentucky case law provided that
an illegitimate child could inherit from an intestate father if paternity was proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Id at 312. Furthermore, a statute (later repealed) provided that heirs and
devisees could be liable for debts and liabilities of the decedent as they would have been had
property passed to diem via a will. Id. at 313. The Hibbs court reasoned that the responsibilities
inherent to paternity are "liabilities," and that the deceased's parents could be named as parties,
provided they had received assets from the deceased upon his death. 684 S.W.2d at 313. Thus,
the court said that if the deceased's parents were parties to the paternity action they could be
compelled to submit to blood tests, but if they were merely witnesses they could not be so
compelled. Id. The Hibbs court held that blood tests already taken could be used in any future
trial, but that any order for requested additional HLA tests would depend upon whether the trial
court found, on remand, that the deceased's parents were parties or witnesses, Id at 313-14.
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In 1991, in Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found DNA
testing of living relatives provided the clear and convincing evidence
required to rebut a presumption that a deceased man was the plaintiff's
biological father. 207 The plaintiff sought to maintain a presumption of
paternity so her daughter would be entitled to benefits from a life
insurance policy the deceased obtained as an employee of the United
States Postal Service." The parties presented a variety of conflicting
documentary and testamentary evidence on the parent and child re-
lationship, or lack thereof, between the plaintiff and the deceased. 209
The court reasoned that DNA evidence of non-paternity was more
convincing than the other conflicting evidence offered in support of
paternity."'" The court held the presumption of paternity was overcome
and the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the deceased's life
insurance policy.'"
Upon the death of the insured, the defendant insurance company
deposited the deceased's life insurance proceeds with the district court
so that a determination could be made as to the identity of the de-
ceased's surviving children who were beneficiaries under the policy. 212
The plaintiff provided various evidence that her child was the de-
ceased's daughter, including a birth certificate and baptismal record
listing the deceased as the child's father, testimony that the deceased
had acknowledged paternity and evidence that the deceased had car-
ried the plaintiff's daughter on his insurance policy until the plaintiff
remarried.213 Evidence against paternity included a divorce decree stating
the plaintiff's son was the only child of the marriage between plaintiff
and the deceased, the deceased's last will that designated the plaintiff's
son as primary beneficiary and made no mention of the plaintiff's
2°7 768 F. Supp. 577,580 (S.D. Tex. 1991),
"PAS, 768 F. Supp. at 577-78. State law controlled the establishment of Family relation-
ships under Federal Employees Group Life Insurance policies. Id. at 579. Under Texas law, the
plaintiff was presumed to he the deceased's daughter because she was born within 300 days of
the termination by divorce of the marriage between her mother and the deceased. Id. at 579.
This presumption could be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
211 '/ Id. at 578.
215 1d. at 578-80.
211 Id. at 580.
212 Id. at 578. The deceased was unmarried and had not designated any beneficiary fbr the
policy at the tone of his death. Id. at 577-78. Under federal law, his surviving children were
entitled to the proceeds. Id. at 578. Determination of the identity of his children was controlled
by local law, in this case the law of Texas. Id. at 579.
215 Tipps, 768 F. Supp. at 578. The deceased also carried the plaintiff's son from a previous
marriage on his insurance policy, and there was no indication this gratuitous act demonstrated
any intent to adopt the child. M.
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daughter, and testimony that the deceased had not believed the plain-
tiffs daughter to be his child and that the plaintiff had named another
man as the child's father. 214 The Tipps court found the evidence neither
rebutted nor conclusively determined that the deceased was the child's
father. 21" It reasoned that without accurate, scientific paternity testing,
the presumption of paternity would have been sustained based on the
testimony and other evidence offered.'"
As the deceased provided no genetic material for the tests, deter-
mination of his biological relationship with the child was made by
inference.'" The DNA testing involved comparing blood samples from
the child, the deceased's parents and a son born to the deceased and
the plaintiff.'" The comparison showed the child was only a half sibling
of the deceased's son, that the son was biologically related to the
deceased's parents, and that the child was not so related. 21 A genetic
testing expert testified that these results were at least ninety-five per-
cent conclusive, and probably ninety-nine percent conclusive that the
deceased was not the father of the plaintiffs daughter. 22° The Tipps
court found this clear and convincing evidence of non-paternity was
sufficient to rebut the normal presumption and ordered that the
plaintiff should receive no benefits from the deceased's policy.221
Courts have found that DNA tests performed on the deceased
putative father's relatives can determine paternity posthumously."'" The
DNA tests may result from a court's inherent power to compel the
physical examination of witnesses, or from previously performed tests
offered as evidence. 223 Courts have recognized that DNA tests have the
power to resolve cases in which there would otherwise be no clear
result. 224 Thus, some courts have found it in their inherent power to
214 M.
21r' Id. at 579.
216 a
217 Id. at 580.
2111 Tipps, 768 F. Supp. at 578.
219 Id
22° M. Evidence was presented showing the procedures used by Cellmark to collect and
analyze the blood samples. Id. at 580. The plaintiff apparently refused to provide a blood
sample, which would have enhanced the accuracy of the results. Id. The court reasoned that,
after such a refusal, she should not be allowed to complain the test results were not accurate
enough. Id
221 M at 580-81.
222 See, e.g., Tipp, 768 F. Supp. at 580-81; In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d at 782-83.
223 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Chandler, 684 So.2d 310, 313-14 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (previously per-
formed tests used to determine non-paternity); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 784 (ex-wife, non-party,
ordered to submit to testing under court's inherent power).
224 see Tipps, 768 F. Supp. at 579 (non-DNA evidence neither rebutted nor conclusively
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acknowledge the accuracy and reliability of DNA tests in posthumous
paternity determination S. 225
2. A Statute Allowing a Court to Order Testing
At least one court has relied on civil discovery rules to hold that
collateral parties could be ordered to submit to DNA testing:22"ln 199 1,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir,
employed civil discovery rules to order the legitimate daughter of the
deceased to submit to a blood test for DNA testing. 227 The plaintiff
sought to compel blood testing of the deceased's legitimate daughter
to prove that the plaintiff was the deceased's daughter and thus was
entitled to a share of the deceased's estate. 228 The trial court denied
the plaintiff's motion, finding Louisiana's paternity statute did not
authorize blood tests of siblings, and the plaintiff appealed.'" On
appeal, the Sudwischer court reasoned that, although not technically a
party to the paternity suit, the deceased's legitimate daughter could be
compelled to submit to a blood test under Louisiana's civil discovery
rules.23° The Sudwischer court overturned the trial court and granted
the motion to compel blood testing. 2"
The Sudwischer court held that the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's motion was based on a statute directed at establishing pater-
nity for support actions. 232 The court reasoned that this statute did not
authorize blood tests of siblings because it presumed the existence of
a living putative father.233 The statute did not express a deliberate policy
of limitation on blood testing in other circumstances."'
The court then considered Louisiana's civil discovery rules, which
provide for discovery of any non-privileged matter that is relevant to
established the presumption of paternity); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 783 ("it can go either way" without
DNA tests).
225 See, e.g., TOPS, 768 E Stipp. at 580; Rogers, 583 A.2cl at 783-84.
226 Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpattir, 589 So.2d 474,475-76 (La. 1991).
227
	 at 476. The plaintiff introduced evidence that DNA testing of herself, her mother's
other children, and the decedent's legitimate daughter would establish the probability of rela-
tionship between plaintiff and the illegitimate daughter. Id. at 475. Plaintiffs expert witness
testified that testing of the decedent's tissue was not feasible. Id. Plaintiff's siblings were alleged
to have agreed to be tested. Id.
228 Id. at 474,476.
225
	 at 474. The statute, directed at establishing paternity for purposes of child support,
did not contemplate a deceased putative lather. Id, at 474-75.
"" Id. at 475-76.
251 Sudroiseher, 589 So.2d at 476.
252 Id, at 474-75.
233 See id.
254 Id. at 475.
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the subject matter 235 The court held that, although not originally a
party to the probate action, the deceased's legitimate daughter was a
forced heir to the deceased's estate and had acted through the estate's
attorney in opposing the testing. 2s" The court held that the deceased's
legitimate daughter could be compelled to submit to DNA-based blood
testing under Louisiana's civil discovery rules. 237
The Sudwischer court also held that a balancing of constitutional
rights favored such testing. 2s8 It reasoned that, although the state's
interest in the orderly disposition of estates may bar paternity claims
after estate distribution, no such concern existed where the deceased's
estate was under administration and the illegitimate daughter's claim
was timely. 2" The court said that the plaintiff had a constitutional
right to prove filiation to a deceased father, as well as an overriding
emotional and financial interest in knowing her father's identity.24°
The court weighed this right against the invasion of the legitimate
daughter's privacy that would result from a compelled blood draw-
ing and her financial interest in opposing paternity claims and found
the balance in favor of the illegitimate daughter. 24 ' Based on the con-
stitutional balance and the state's rules of discovery, the court granted
the motion to compel DNA testing of the legitimate daughter's
blood. 242
235 Id
216 Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 475. Although the estate, not the legitimate daughter, was
technically the party to the probate proceeding, there appeared little doubt the legitimate
daughter was resisting the plaintiff's claims and had a substantial interest in not sharing the
deceased's estate valued at $2,000,000. Id. at 477 n.2 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 47(1,
238 Id. at 475-76.
239 Id
24° Id at 476; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764-65, 776 (1977).
241 Stulwischer, 589 So.2d at 476. The legitimate daughter raised no claims of physical danger
or religious belief in opposition to the blood testing. Id. Thus, the court found the invasion to
the legitimate daughter's privacy was minimal, and that she had the alternative of conceding her
father's paternity of the plaintiff. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Dennis stated that the
illegitimate daughter had no constitutional rights to balance against those of the legitimate
daughter because no statute infringed impermissibly on her right to pursue a claim of legitimacy
and there had been no affirmative state action to interfere with her right of equal protection of
the law. Id at 478 (Dennis, J., dissenting). He argued that, as the legitimate daughter fell outside
the express terms of the blood testing statute and was not a party to the paternity action, the
state had a limited and minimal interest in compelling a blood test. Id. Justice Dennis felt this
interest was insufficient to justify an order compelling blood testing, when balanced against the
legitimate daughter's privacy interest. Id. Justice Dennis further argued that the state interest in
discouraging multiple paternity actions, especially those brought solely for inheritance rights, was
an additional reason against ordering blood testing. Id. at 478-79.
242 u at 476.
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3. Statutes Barring Use of Testing
On the other hand, some courts have found that a state statute
barred DNA testing of collateral heirs. 243 For example, in 1990, in
William M. v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal for the
Third District held that the parents of the putative father could not be
ordered to submit to blood tests to determine whether their deceased
son was the father of the plaintiff's child. 244 The trial court, citing its
inherent power, had granted the plaintiffs request for an order com-
pelling the deceased's parents to submit to blood tests and the parents
appealed. 245 The William M. court reasoned that neither the rules of
evidence that permitted blood tests to determine paternity, nor the
civil discovery provisions permitting physical examination of parties,
authorized the testing of the putative father's parents. 2" It vacated the
lower court's order compelling the parents of the deceased to submit
to blood tests.247
Dana F., the plaintiff in the original action, argued that Califor-
nia's Evidence Code, which permitted a court to order the mother,
child and alleged father to submit to blood tests, did not prohibit a
trial court from ordering other parties to submit to blood tests. 248 The
William M. court held that, given the invasion of privacy caused by
compelled blood tests, the language of the evidence code expressed a
deliberate policy of limitation on the ordering of blood tests. 249 The
court held that the evidence code did not authorize a trial court to
order putative grandparents to submit to blood tests. 25°
The plaintiff also argued that California's Code of Civil Procedure
authorized the physical or mental examination of a party to the action,
245 See, e.g., William M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (Ct. App. 1990) (putative
grandparents could not be tested); In re Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 539, 545 (Ct. App. 1992)
(legitimate children and their mothers could not be tested),
244 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). The real party in interest was Dana E, the
mother of a child born on June 6, 1986, who had obtained a court order instructing William and
Bonnie M. to submit to testing. Id. at 109. The mother claimed the deceased was the child's
father, although when the deceased died in December 1986, six months after the child's birth,
he had not married the plaintiff nor legitimated the child. Id.
245 William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The court did not indicate what type of blood tests were
to be performed. See id. Either MLA or DNA testing could have been used to compare samples
taken from living child, mother and putative grandparents. See supra, Section 11 for a discussion
of the different methods of paternity testing.
246 Id. at 104-05,
247 Id, at 107.
248 Id. at 104 .
242 /d. at 105.
250 William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
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at the plaintiffs request. 251
 The issue before the court was whether the
parents of the deceased were parties to the action under the California
Civil Code. 252
 The court concluded the alleged paternal grandparents
were not proper parties to a paternity action, either in their individual
capacity or as parents of the deceased putative father. 253
 Hence, the
William M. court held that civil discovery rules did not authorize a trial
court to order grandparents to submit to blood tests.'"
Following its statutory analysis, the William M. court expressed
concern over the possible repercussions of allowing putative grandpar-
ents to be ordered to submit to blood tests in paternity actions. 2" The
court reasoned that allowing such suits could result in similar suits to
test brothers, sisters, cousins or other relatives of the deceased putative
father, where his parents were no longer living. 256
 The court noted that
Minnesota was the only state with a statute allowing trial courts to order
testing of the decedent's relatives. 257
 The William M court then held
that any decision to extend the list of parties who could be ordered to
submit to blood testing in paternity actions must be made by the
legislature.258
In 1990, the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in In re Estate of
Erbe, held that because state law made no provision for proving pater-
nity after the putative father's death, the court did not need to address
the ordering of blood tests to establish an illegitimate child's heir-
ship.'" Although the court did not indicate what type of blood testing
25t Id
252 id
233 M The court interpreted the California Civil Code to mean the only people who are
proper defendant parties to a paternity action are the mother, child and any person presumed
or alleged to be the father. Id.
251 Id, at 107. The court held that it was not a denial of due process and equal protection
for the law to allow putative grandparents to bring a paternity action while precluding the mother
from asserting her own paternity action against the putative grandparents, as the parties were
not similarly situated. Id, at 105-06. Putative grandparents had an interest in establishing a legal
relationship with a child allegedly fathered by their deceased son, and would have limited
entitlement to seek visitation rights with their grandchildren under California law. Id. at 106.
Conversely, the grandparents have no legal responsibility for the support or rearing of the child.
Id. Thus, there are no rights in the child that can be enforced directly against the grandparents.
Id. Therefore, the court found that it was reasonable for the legislature to have declined to make
putative grandparents subject to suit as defendants in a paternity action, given that their interest
in the question is not mandatory. Id.
255 William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
256 id.
257 M at 106 n.5. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Minnesota statute.
258
 William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
259 457 N.W.2d 867, 868-69 (S.D. 1990). The court never indicated whom the plaintiff wanted
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the plaintiff sought, the dissenting opinion's reasoning relied heavily
on the accuracy of DNA testing. 26° South Dakota law required the
father's signed, witnessed writing acknowledging paternity before an
illegitimate child could become an heir of his or her father. 261 South
Dakota had no provisions for determination of paternity after the
father's death. 262 The Erbe court acknowledged that the law operated
unfairly as applied to individuals who would otherwise be able to
establish a relationship to their deceased fathers, but reasoned that the
statute's rational relationship to legitimate state interests justified the
denial of the right to prove paternity after the father's death. 263 The
court held there was no way for an illegitimate child to become legiti-
mated after his or her father's death, and that the court had no
authority to order blood tests to prove paternity. 2b'
ChiefJustice Wuest, in his dissenting opinion, declared it offensive
to his sense of justice that an illegitimate child could not inherit from
his or her father unless explicitly acknowledged by the father.2" He
argued the state's interest in the orderly disposition of property could
be preserved merely by imposing a higher burden of proof on posthu-
mous paternity proceedings, noting that other jurisdictions allow ille-
gitimate children to prove the paternity of a deceased putative father
by clear and convincing evidence.'" He further observed that genetic
testing to prove paternity had been found reliable by many courts,
including the Ohio trial court in Alexander v. Alexander, which ordered
exhumation of the putative father so DNA tests could be performed. 267
Chief,
 justice Wuest reasoned that these facts made the South Dakota
to have tested, but the only likely parties mentioned arc the deceased's two surviving sisters and
the plaintiff's mother. See id at 867-68.
260 Id. at 872 (Wuest, CJ., dissenting).
261 Id. at 869. In South Dakota, an illegitimate child was always an heir to his or her mother,
and shared equally with her legitimate children in inheriting from her kindred. Id. An illegitimate
child, nevertheless, did not inherit from the estate of his or her father's unless the parents married
and the father acknowledged paternity or adopted the child. Id.
262 See id. at 871 (Wuest, C.J., dissenting).
263 Id. at 869-70. The court found the statute served state interests by protecting the sanctity
of a will and providing for the orderly settlement of estates. Id. at 869. The court reasoned that
the statute did not distinguish between legitimates and illegitimates, but between categories of
illegitimates. Id. at 870. The court further reasoned that problems of proof in posthumous claims
of paternity justified the requirement for such documentary evidence signed by the putative
father. Id. The court found the statute "carefully tuned" to state interests and, therefore, not a
violation of equal protection. Id. at 869-70.
264 See Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 868,871.
265 Id. at 871 (Wuest,	 dissenting).
266 Id. at 872 (Wuest, CI, dissenting).
267 Id. at 872; see also Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.,2d 1310,1314 (Franklin County, Ohio
C.P. 1988).
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statute's denial to the plaintiff of any opportunity to inherit from the
deceased, because he had never been acknowledged by the deceased,
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated. 268
 He would have permitted the plaintiff to maintain the
action, with the requirement that paternity be proved by clear and
convincing evidence with DNA testing or other means. 26°
Subsequently, in 1992, in In re Estate of Sanders, the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that a putative father's
children and their mothers could not be ordered to provide blood
samples for DNA testing.'" The plaintiff had asked the probate court
to order DNA tests of the deceased's relatives to verify her claim that
she was the deceased's natural daughter and entitled to a portion of
his estate as a pretermitted heir.'" The plaintiff offered proof the
deceased had acknowledged paternity, but not that he had "openly and
notoriously" held her out to be his child, as required by statute. 272
 The
court held the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for posthu-
mous paternity determination, and upheld the probate court's denial
of the plaintiff's request for DNA tests.'"
Citing William M. v. Superior Court, the Sanders court first held
that the probate court lacked the authority to order the mothers of
the deceased's surviving children to give blood samples for DNA test-
ing. 274 The Sanders court then held that there were no provisions of
law to support the requested DNA tests of the deceased's other chil-
dren.275
 The court first considered the California Probate Code that
provides for a natural parent and child relationship to be proven under
the Uniform Parentage Act, but that the relationship may not be
established unless either a court order declaring paternity was entered
"Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 871 (Wuest, Cj., dissenting).
2511 Id at 872 (Wuest, C.j., dissenting).
270 3 Cal. Rpm 2d 536, 539, 545 (Ct. App. 1992). The plaintiff made two proposals, one to
test the putative father's legitimate children and their mothers, and a second that did not involve
testing the children's mothers. Id. at 539. The court considered both proposals, and found
neither was authorized under California law. Id. at 540, 545. The mothers were not parties to the
probate proceedings, as they were both divorced from the deceased and not named in his will,
which bequeathed all of his property in equal shares to his three legitimate children. Id. at 537,
539.
271 Id at 537-39. The plaintiff did not formally request DNA testing, but her pleadings prayed
for "subsequent discovery orders necessary to prove ... paternity," and included declarations by
two DNA experts. Id. at 539 n.5. The Sanders court inferred from the record before it that the
plaintiff had, in fact, requested that the discussed DNA tests he ordered. Id.
272 M at 538, 541.
273 M at 538, 541, 546.
274 M at 539.
275 Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540.
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during the father's lifetime or paternity was established by clear and
convincing evidence that the father has openly and notoriously held
out the child as his own. 27G As originally introduced, the legislation in-
cluded explicit language endorsing the use of other methods to deter-
mine paternity, but this language was removed before the section was
enacted.277
 The court concluded the act should not be construed to
include the omitted methods such as genetic testing. 278 The court held
that, despite advances in DNA technology, the law provided no method
for the deceased's paternity to be determined after his death. 279
The plaintiff argued that advances in genetic testing rendered the
court's construction of the probate code obsolete because these ad-
vancements had removed the problems of uncertainty of proving pa-
ternity in probate proceedings that had been the justification for the
statute. 28°The Sanders court recognized that DNA testing had removed
this uncertainty.281
 The court reasoned, however, that it could not
consider such scientific advances absent legislative action. 282 The court
thus held that any reexamination of the law based on scientific ad-
vances must come from the legislature, rather than from the courts
sitting as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom of statutes. 283
279 /d. at 540; CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408 (West 1991).
277 M at 54112. The original version included the statement that, "Nothing in this subdivi-
sion limits the methods by which the relationship of parent and child may be established." Id. at
542. This made it "clear that the parent and child relationship may be established in such other
proceedings as a child support action." M The court also noted that the legislature had revisited
the section three Limes since its adoption without altering its position on the issue. Id. at 543.
278 Id. at 543.
279 Id. at 544, 546.
280 Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 544.
281 Id. The court noted the author of the legislation had indicated the restrictive language's
purpose was "to discourage dubious paternity claims from being made after the flither's death
for the sole purpose of inheritance," Id. at 543 11.15.
292 Id. Al 544. "While perhaps only the proverbial ostrich with its head in the sand would
dispute the fact remarkable progress has been made in these areas in recent years, we need not
dwell on these advances rin DNA based paternity testing]," Id. At the time of the Sanders case, a
petition for review had been filed with the Supreme Court of California on the first published
California opinion validating DNA testing under the Kelly -Frye test, which requires that scientific
methods offered as evidence be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. at
544 n.18; see California v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 421-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (murder case). The
petition for review was heard on January 30, 1992, 23 days after the Sanders case was heard.
Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 545 n.*.
283 Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544. The court fUrther held that the statute did not violate the
principle of equal protection, although it effectively barred any posthumous determination in
the case before the court. Id. at 544-45. It noted the Supreme Court had upheld a more restrictive
statute in 1978, citing Lath. a. Lath. Id. at 545 & n.19; see supra, note 76 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Lath. The Sanders court again noted that any lifting of restrictions or reevalu-
ation of the law in light of scientific advances was better made by the legislature. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2c1
at 545.
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Some courts have held that narrowly drawn statutes prevented
them from acknowledging the potential of DNA testing in posthumous
paternity determinations. 2" Restrictions on bringing posthumous pa-
ternity actions, on what evidence may be offered and on who may be
made parties to such actions have all served to deny trial courts the
ability to consider DNA tests in posthumous paternity actions. 288 At
least two courts have called for legislative, rather than judicial, reex-
amination of statutes in light of advances in paternity testing. 286 Thus,
these courts have found that current statutes prevented them from
using the power of DNA testing of the deceased's relatives in posthu-
mous paternity actions. 287
IV. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS MANDATE LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
There is no longer any rational justification for blanket restric-
tions on the right of illegitimate children to bring posthumous pater-
nity claims.288
 The United States Supreme Court and societal changes
have eliminated the justifications based on issues of perceived morality
or protection of family values. 289 The accuracy of DNA technology has
eliminated the justifications of problems of proof and fear of fraudu-
lent claims.29° It is time for the law and the courts to respond to the
power of DNA testing by giving illegitimate children a general right to
bring posthumous paternity claims. 29 '
Discouraging behavior viewed as immoral and protecting the fam-
ily served as justifications to prevent or severely restrict paternity claims,
especially those brought after the putative father's death. 292 The United
States Supreme Court has held, however, that discouraging immoral
284 See, e.g., William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. al 104-05; Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541; In re Estate
of Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 869-71.
285
 See, e.g., William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05 (evidence code limited to testing mother,
father, and child; civil discovery code limited to ordering physical examination of parties);
Sanders, 3 Cal. Rim-. 2c1 at 539-41 (deceased's relatives could not be made parties; action did not
meet narrow requirements for posthumous determination); Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 871 (posthumous
actions not allowed for intestate succession purposes).
286 William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 106; Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549-45.
287 See William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07; Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539, 545; Erbe, 457
N.W.2c1 at 868,871.
288 See Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310,1314 (Franklin County, Ohio C.P. 1988).
289 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text for a discussion or the elimination of these
justifications.
290 See supra Section II for a discussions of the accuracy of DNA based paternity testing and
its usefulness in posthumous paternity cases.
291 See infra Section IV.D for proposed changes to the Uniform Parentage Act and Uniform
Act on Paternity.
292 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of these justifications.
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behavior in their parents is an unacceptable justification for statutory
discrimination against illegitimate children. 293 Protection of families by
conserving the father's wealth and sparing his wife from having to
acknowledge her husband's other children fails as a justification for
discrimination against illegitimate children in modern society. 294 With
increasingly common second marriages and alimony payments to pre-
vious wives, and stepchildren increasingly counted as members of fam-
ily units, there can be no justification for discrimination against ille-
gitimate children as a way of preserving the traditional family structure. 295
The only remaining justification for discrimination against illegitimate
children bringing posthumous paternity actions has been the problem
of proof.
The accuracy of DNA-based paternity testing has rendered obso-
lete the use of problems of proof and fear of fraudulent claims as
justifications for restricting the right of illegitimate children to bring
posthumous paternity claims. 296 DNA-based tests make it possible, for
the first time, to determine paternity accurately long after the putative
father's death. 297 Although problems with sample degradation or un-
availability may prevent the use of DNA tests in some paternity cases,
the fact that a method is not always available should not deny its use
in cases where it has the power to offer probative, if not conclusive,
evidence. DNA testing promises to replace the conflicting testimony
and inconclusive evidence of paternity trials with settlement confer-
ences that leave little to argue over other than whether the testing was
performed properly and what the plaintiff will receive. 299 All that re-
mains is for the law and the courts to incorporate the accuracy of this
new method into their responses to illegitimate children seeking to
bring posthumous paternity claims.
A. Testing the Putative Father
The inadequacies of older testing methods when the putative
father was deceased previously reduced posthumous paternity suits to
little more than swearing contests, in which the alleged father was
unable to participate.299 To avoid these problems of proof, many states
293 Trimble v. Cordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 &n..13, 776 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,
70-72 (1968).
294 See Krause, supra note 31, at 492-94.
295 See id.
296 Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Franklin County, Ohio C.P. 1988).
297 See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
298 See Longobardi, supra note 115, at 351.
299 See Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314.
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required public acknowledgment by the father before an illegitimate
child could inherit by intestate succession." ) The law has steadily ad-
vanced, however, toward affording equal protection and equal rights
to illegitimate children."' For example, the United .States Supreme
Court has found that scientific advances in blood-based non-DNA
paternity testing of living putative fathers may mandate the removal of
statutory limitations on paternity actions. 302 The Court reasoned that
advances in blood testing rendered more attenuated the relationship
between restrictions on paternity claims and a state's interest in pre-
venting the prosecution of fraudulent paternity claims." Because DNA
testing offers posthumous results more accurate than those available
from blood tests on living putative fathers at the time of the Court's
decisions, it is time to extend the Court's reasoning to posthumous
paternity claims and allow illegitimate children to bring posthumous
paternity actions based on the genetic evidence of DNA tests."'
Testing the genetic material of deceased putative fathers is easily
justified. These men could have been compelled to submit to DNA
tests while they were still alive; their estates and the law should not be
allowed to refuse such testing after their deaths."' Inconvenience in-
volved in exhuming the deceased or collecting samples prior to burial
should not deprive illegitimate children of the right to establish pater-
nity and their resulting rights to inheritance and various other benefits.
Despite the power of DNA testing, some states still do not allow post-
humous determinations of paternity based on scientific fact, but con-
tinue to require that the putative father have taken affirmative action
to recognize paternity during his lifetime. 307 There is no valid justifica-
tion for the restrictions on DNA testing that still exist, given our
current ability to make accurate posthumous paternity determinations.
The law and the courts must recognize the accuracy of DNA testing,
3°° See itL at 1312; see supra note 43 for examples of restrictions imposed on posthumous
paternity actions.
3°1 See Longohardi, supra note 115, at 351.
"Clark v. Deter, 486 U.S. 456, 463 (1988); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 17-18 (1983).
3115 Pickett, 462 U.S. at 17.
304 See supra notes 89 and 94-95 for a comparison of the accuracy of various testing methods.
355 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § II (1973) (The court may, and upon request of a
party shall, require the ... alleged father to submit to blood tests"); UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
§ 7 (1960) ("The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any
person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party ... shall order ... the alleged
father to submit to blood tests.").
306 See, e.g., Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1311, 1314; In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749,
750, 757 (Pa. Super. Gt. 1991).
3°7 See Inheritance Rights, supra note 33, at 188 & n.118.
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even after the putative father's death, and endorse the technique as
a method of proving paternity before or after the putative father's
death."
B. Testing Collateral Parties
Testing collateral persons, such as blood relatives and wives, pre-
sents more complicated issues. Traditionally, the mother, child and
putative father are parties to a paternity action and can be ordered to
submit to testing.309
 Even when other relatives are parties to paternity
actions, for example, as personal representatives of deceased fathers
for estate purposes, there are often other people needed for testing
who are not parties to the action."° Some courts have responded to
this situation by compelling collateral persons to submit to DNA tests,
relying on the courts' inherent powers or on civil discovery rules, while
other courts have found themselves blocked by statutes from testing
collateral persons."'
it is easier to justify the compelled testing of collateral persons
when the deceased's estate is at question and the collateral persons are
beneficiaries under the estate. 312
 By refusing to accede to DNA tests,
collateral persons withhold evidence that is highly probative and often
determinative."' Equity demands that those seeking to profit from a
denial of paternity not be allowed to withhold crucial evidence that
could prove paternity.'"
"See Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314.
"See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 9 (1973) ("The child shall be made a party to the
action.... The natural mother, each man presumed to be the father ... and each man alleged
to be the natural father shall be made parties. . . .").
510 See, e.g., In re Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 539, 545 (CL App. 1992); Sudwischer
v. Estate of Hoffpauir,. 589 So.2d 474, 475 (La. 1991); Voss v. Duerscherl, 425 N.W.2d 828, 829,
831 (Minn. 1988); In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App, Div. 1900).
511
 See, e.g., William M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (CL App. 1990) (evidence
code and civil discovery rules prevented court from ordering testing); Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at
475-76 (civil discovery rules used to order testing); Rogers, 583 A.2d at 784-85 (inherent powers
used to order testing). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do nut allow a court to make such
an order. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35. Their provisions only provide for the examination of the
physical condition (including blood group) of parties and persons under the custody or control
of parties. Exp. R. Civ. P. 35(a). Furthermore, the section's use of the phrase "blood group" could
be interpreted as limiting other types of blood-based testing including DNA fingerprinting. See
id.
312 See, e.g., Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 477 n.2 (Lemnion, J., concurring) (deceased's daughter,
riot a party to proceeding ordered to submit to blood testing to determine if plaintiff had
legitimate claim to portion of $2,000,000 estate).
515 /d. at 475.
114 See In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749, 755-56 (Pa. Super. CL 1991).
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The deceased's relatives could defeat this demand for equity,
however, by ceasing to be beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. The
deceased's wife could disclaim any devises or bequests made to her, or
her intestate share, thereby ceasing to be a party to the probate ac-
tion.315
 Conversely, the deceased's children could disclaim their shares
and cease to be parties to any probate action, increasing the share the
deceased's wife would take.316 The deceased's wife could then make
gifts to the children to achieve distribution results similar to what
would have happened had the children taken under a will or by
intestate succession. Either method would transform individuals essen-
tial to DNA testing from collateral parties to the underlying probate
action into nonparties. Collateral persons needed for DNA testing
could cease to be parties while still benefiting from the deceased's
wealth, undercutting equity's demand that they consent to DNA test-
ing.
A different justification is required to compel collateral persons
to submit to DNA tests when there is no estate, or when persons who
are not beneficiaries of an estate are needed for testing. 3 ' 7 The invasion
of collateral persons' privacy caused by the DNA testing must be bal-
anced against the illegitimate child's interest in proving paternity. 318 A
collateral person may suffer two invasions: that of a needle for collec-
tion of a blood sample, and that of acknowledgment that a deceased
relative fathered an illegitimate child. Collection of a blood sample is
a de minimis and momentary invasion, absent any claim of physical
danger or religious belief in opposition to blood testing."' Some state
courts have reached this conclusion when considering the collection
of blood samples from collateral parties for DNA tests to prove pater-
nity. 3" Often, a collateral person has the option of conceding paternity,
thereby nullifying the need to give a blood sample. 32 ' The fact that
paternity is an adjudicable matter that becomes part of the public
313 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGIAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 49.11 (1962). Such a
disclaimer would cause the wife's share to pass to other beneficiaries if there was a will—usually
her children by the deceased—or increase her children's intestate share if there was no will. Id.
§ 49.12.
31r,
	 at § 49.11 to 49.12.
317 In addition to the more devious scenarios described in the text for making collateral
sources nonparties, the mother of the deceased's legitimate children may be a nonparty due to
an earlier divorce. See In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
319 See Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So.2d 474, 476 (La, 1991).
319 Id. at 476.
3211 Sudwiseher, 589 So.2d at 476 (deceased's legitimate daughter ordered to submit); Rogers,
583 A.2d at 783 (deceased's ex-wife ordered to submit).
321 See Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 476.
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record clearly demonstrates that avoiding a forced acknowledgment
that a deceased relative fathered an illegitimate child is not a protected
in terest 522
The illegitimate child's interests in proving paternity weigh heavily
against a collateral person's interest in not providing a blood sample
for DNA testing. 323 These interests include the rights to know who his
or her father was, to share in the father's estate, and to establish
eligibility to various government welfare and benefits programs, 324 Where
a paternity suit is brought to establish the right to state or federal
benefits, the interests of the government in preventing fraud and
ensuring equitable distribution of benefits are also weighed against the
interests of collateral persons who seek to avoid testing. In a balancing
of the rights of all parties, some courts have found that the interests
of proving paternity clearly outweigh the collateral persons' interests
in avoiding compelled testing."5
Moreover, future scientific developments will reduce the burden
DNA testing places on collateral persons, shifting the balance further
in favor of the illegitimate child. Today, most DNA-based paternity tests
use blood samples. 326 Methods exist and are being developed, however,
to test fingernails, hair, urine and other sources, the collection of which
is less invasive than the taking of a blood sample. 327 Furthermore, state
and federal agencies are compiling DNA databanks, increasing the
likelihood that samples from the deceased or collateral parties will
already be available.'28 States concerned with providing samples for
322 S„, e.g., IJNffultra Act' ON PATERNITY § 2 (1960).
525 See Sudwisrher, 580 So.2d at 476.
524 1d. at 475. There is little justification for testing third parties when the illegitimate child's
interest is mere curiosity, rather than estate or government benefits. A recent, well publicized
example of such a posthumous paternity claim is that of Henry Leon Ritzenthaler who was
allegedly conceived by President Clinton's Luther, William Jefferson Blythe, on the day Blythe and
Ritzendialer's mother signed divorce papers. Tom Mashberg, Man Who Would Be First Brother
Put in Limelight, BosToN army, June 23, 1903, at 1. Ritzenthaler has said: "I just want to tell
him [President Clinton] that he has a brother.... After that, a Christmas card once a year would
be just fine.' Id.
323 See, e.g., Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 476. To avoid needlessly burdening collateral parties,
plaintiffs may he required to make a preliminary showing that the deceased was his or her father,
perhaps using a preponderance of the evidence standard, and that there is a need for DNA testing
belbre a court orders blood tests. See Rogers, 583 .2t1 at 785.
326 See CELINARK DIAGNOSTICS, PATERNITY TEsTING FAcas 2 (1988).
327 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Mihalovich, Forensic Science Associates (Jan. 22,
1993).
328 Nova: Morrie); Rape and DNA (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1993). In addition to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's growing DNA database, at least 20 states have laws that require
them to collect blood samples from people convicted of certain crimes so their DNA may be
included in databases. M.
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paternity testing also could require a blood test whenever parents were
granted a divorce, as well as requiring the test as .a prerequisite to
marriage, thereby expanding the number of samples available for
future paternity actions. Thus, the privacy concerns of collateral parties
whose DNA is needed for paternity determination are becoming even
more de minimis due to the proliferation of sources and methods that
do not require blood samples. As a result, the balance will shift further
in favor of requiring that collateral persons submit to DNA testing in
paternity determinations where the putative father is deceased.
C. Future Implications of DNA Technology
The increasing acceptance of DNA testing for posthumous deter-
minations of paternity will not be without its problems. For example,
it may lead to battles for control over existing DNA samples. The
United States Department of Defense has created a repository of ge-
netic information from all active American service members, and at
least twenty states have legislation authorizing the creation of DNA
databanks for convicted sex offenders. 39 The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and several police departments have also begun the creation
of DNA data banks. 3" Although these data banks are being created for
forensic and criminal identification purposes, the samples they contain
could easily be used in paternity determinations. Moreover, as the
number of men and women whose DNA is stored in the various data
banks increases, it may be possible to reconstruct DNA sequences of
individuals based on stored samples from their relatives."' Absent clear
legislative guidelines, litigation will likely result as illegitimate children
seek to use these samples to prove paternity, while the database crea-
tors and the deceased's relatives argue that such a use is not author-
ized.
The power of DNA technology also will affect the privacy of all
concerned. The privacy interests of the putative father's living relatives
will be subsumed to the interests of illegitimate children in proving
329 Id. These samples will not be made available for criminal investigations or paternity cases,
unless subpoenaed by court order. U.S. to Keep Genetic Data on Military, CHICAGO Tim., Jan. 12,
1992, at 3. Nova: Murder, Rape and DNA (PBS television broadcast; Mar. 2, 1993).
33°E. Donald Shapiro & Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The Dangerous Erosion
of Privacy, 38 Cmv. Sr. L. RE v. 455, 474 & :111.97-98 (1990).
551 See, e.g., Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1991);
Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 475; CEI. LMARK, supra note 16, at 8. The increased availability of DNA
samples in databanks may reduce the demands to exhume the bodies of putative fathers or to
test collateral parties, while providing higher quality DNA samples for testing.
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paternity.332 Just as the living can be made parties to paternity actions
in every state, so shall. the dead. Fathers will go to their graves less
secure in the belief that a refusal to acknowledge illegitimate offspring
prevents illegitimate children from ever establishing paternityP The
ability to litigate issues of paternity long after the putative father's
death will greatly alter the expectations of privacy and finality that have
been associated with one's death.'" Whatever actual rights to privacy
a father of illegitimate children may enjoy are ended upon his death. 3"
Furthermore, his rights to privacy are not assignable, and cannot be
maintained by other persons such as members of the individual's
"2 See, e.g., Sudwischer, 589 Stt2d at 476 (legitimate daughter's privacy interest outweighed
by emotional and financial interests of alleged illegitimate child).
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	 statutes and case law change, estate planners and attorneys will need to adapt their
practices to the new realities of DNA testing technology. When advising a client who wishes to
avoid a posthumous paternity claim, attorneys will need to discuss the extraordinary measures
required to ensure that no DNA samples survive the deceased. These measures could include,
among others, cremation, destruction of any blood banked in the client's name, destruction of
biopsy and other tissue samples, and destruction of frozen embryos. See supra notes 114-15 for
a discussion of sources of DNA other that the putative father's blood. See Gerhardt v. Estate of
Moore, 441 N.W,2d 734, 740 (Wis. 1989) for a case in which cremation prevented a posthumous
challenge to an admission of paternity made as part of a lump-sum support payment agreement-
See Michelle F. Sublett, Note, Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat Them,
38 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 585 (1990) for a discussion of whether frozen embryos should be treated as
life or as destructible property. The client may want to include a provision in his will instructing
his administrator to seek destruction of any blood or tissue samples held by the coroner. See In
re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2c1 749, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The ethical considerations of
advising a client to eliminate sources of genetic material to avoid a posthumous paternity claim
are beyond the scope of this Note. Conversely, attorneys assisting clients in bringing paternity
actions following the putative father's death need to consider a broad range of possible sample
sources for DNA testing. See supra notes 114-15 for a discussion of alternate sources of genetic
material. The increased likelihood of a posthumous paternity claim also may make non-probate
instruments more attractive as a way of reducing the estate's size and, thereby, making such a suit
less attractive, A recent example of how one attorney responded to the accuracy of DNA testing
is the case of William Yacohozzi, Jr., who was sentenced to 180 days in jail and three years'
probation after being found guilty of having an impostor take his place at a DNA test ordered as
part of a paternity suit filed against him. Lily Dizon, Yambozzi Sentenced to Jail Term, L.A. Tip,ms,
Mar. 7, 1992, at B3. The State Bar of California also temporarily revoked his license because of
the felony convictions for perjury, falsifying evidence and conspiring to obstruct justice. id.
994 For example, a farmer's funeral was delayed when the coroner recalled the body for DNA
tests and reftused to release it for cremation following a claim that the deceased had fathered an
illegitimate son 23 years earlier. Tanya Reed, Farmer's Funeral Halted After Claim Over Paternity,
THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), June 5, 1992, at 2. At stake was ownership of a farmhouse and 140
acres of grazing land which had been in the deceased's family for over 350 years. Id, A court in
Lorain County ordered what was believed to be the first exhumation in Ohio for DNA testing to
determine paternity. Body to be Exhumed in Civil Case, UPI, May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPI File. At stake was an estate worth $10,500 and the legitimacy of a teenage boy.
Id.
555 3 RF,STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1976).
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family.n6
 One who fathers illegitimate children has no reasonable ex-
pectation that his actions will remain private after his death.
The final threat perceived from increased use of genetic testing is
its ability to reveal intensely personal information about its subjects.'"
DNA probes already have the capability to identify genetic defects
including Huntington's Chorea, muscular dystrophy, Down's syndrome
and sickle cell anemia.'" Because genetic traits are passed from parent
to child, any revelation of the father's genetic predisposition to certain
diseases or conditions could also reveal information about his blood
relatives' genetic makeup. Although the probes currently used to cre-
ate DNA fingerprints for paternity testing identify nothing related to
the individuals' intelligence, sex, physical appearance, or even their
species, as the sophistication of DNA probes and fingerprinting in-
creases, steps will need to be taken to ensure that personal information
is not revealed."'
The problems posed by an increasing acceptance of DNA testing
for posthumous paternity determinations will occur even if courts and
legislatures are hesitant to accept the new technology. The application
of DNA technology to criminal, forensic and other investigations and
the technology's potential to reveal intensely private information will
amplify the privacy issues surrounding DNA databanks, regardless of
whether it is used in paternity determinations. The trend toward in-
creasing the right of illegitimate children to bring paternity actions,
even after a putative father's death, is likely to continue, regardless of
how rapidly states adapt their laws to reflect the promise of DNA
technology. Courts will continue to face issues concerning the order-
ing, use and admissibility of DNA paternity tests, regardless of whether
states change their laws. The problems surrounding the increased use
of DNA testing for posthumous paternity determination are not avoid-
able, and are best met by direct legislative action.
D. Proposed Changes to Uniform  Acts
State statutes governing paternity determination vary widely, espe-
cially for actions brought after the putative father's death. 34° The mod-
3341 hi; see, e.g., Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Examiner, 475 N.W.2d 304, 309-10 (Mich.
1991).
337 See Longobardi, supra note 115, at 331-32.
"8 M
339 Id at 332, 338 n.97. It is impossible to distinguish a gorilla's DNA fingerprint from that
of a human; they are both just a series of lines on an X-ray. Id. at 332 n.70.
3 '1°See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of different burdens of
proof and other requirements for posthumous paternity actions.
May 1994]
	
POSTHUMOUS PATERNITY DETERMINATION 	 795
ern trend is to allow posthumous actions, with proof by clear and
convincing evidence."' Many current statutes, however, including the
Uniform Parentage Act and Uniform Act on Paternity, were drafted
before the development of DNA testing and do not reflect the tech-
nique's power and accuracy. 342 As a result, illegitimate children are
often prevented from using the most probative, most clear and con-
vincing evidence of paternity—DNA test results—by narrowly drawn
statutes that are unreceptive to the new method. 343 DNA tests allow an
illegitimate child with substantial evidence of paternity to establish a
higher level of proof and certainty; the tests may be the only way an
illegitimate child whose father denied paternity can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that a parent and child relationship existed. 344 By
recognizing the power of DNA testing, states will further the trend
toward allowing reliable posthumous paternity determinations, proven
by clear and convincing evidence, while endorsing the use of the most
probative evidence available. 345
As examples of the types of changes needed, this Note proposes
modifications to two uniform acts. These proposed changes place DNA
fingerprinting on the same footing as commonly used blood tests,
including Human Leukocyte Antigen tests. They clearly resolve the
issue of testing collateral parties in favor of the illegitimate child, while
only allowing the court to order such testing after a showing that
probative evidence is likely to result. Additionally, the changes recog-
nize DNA databases as both an alternate source of genetic samples and
as a way of reducing the incidence of compelled testing of the de-
ceased's relatives. Finally, the changes recognize the potential of DNA
technology to reveal personal information other than paternity by
imposing a ban on testing that would expose this information.
341 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE Ac'r (1973); UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY (1960).
542 The Unitiom Parentage Act and Uniform Act on Paternity were drafted in 1973 and 1960,
respectively. While both include provisions for blood tests, they are written with the presumption
that the father is a living party to the action, and make no mention of DNA fingerprinting, that
may be highly probative after the father's death, when there is no longer blood available for
testing. See UNIFORM PARENTAGE Ace § I I (1973); UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY § 7 (1960).
343 LC Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 E Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (DNA test results ignored
due to statute's narrow requirements); William M. v. Superior Court, '275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (Ct.
App. 1990) (putative grandparents could not be ordered to submit to DNA tests); In is Erbe, 457
N.W.2d 867, 868-89 (S.D. 1990) (law made no provisions for posthumous paternity determina-
tion).
344 In re Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 538, 545 (Ct. App. 1992) (alleged fluffier never
acknowledged paternity; use of DNA tests denied by statutory limits); Batcheldor v. lloyd, 423
S.E.2d 810, 811-12 (N.C. Ca. App. 1992) (considerable evidence of paternity would be strength-
ened by DNA tests).
545 .Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 871-72 (Wuest, C.J., dissenting).
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To facilitate the use of DNA testing in • posthumous paternity
actions, Section 11 of the Uniform Parentage Act, currently entitled
"Blood Tests," should be changed as follows: 346
§ I1. [Blood and DNA Tests]
(a) The court may, and upon request of a party shall, require
the child, mother, or alleged father to submit to blood or
DNA tests. The tests shall be performed by an expert qualified
as an examiner of blood types or DNA_ fingerprints, ap-
pointed by the court.
(b) The court, upon reasonable request by a party, shall order
that independent tests be performed by other experts qualified
as examiner of blood types or DNA fingerprints.
(c) In all cases, the court shall determine the number and
qualifications of the experts.
(d) If the alleged father is deceased, the court may order
DNA testing	 .11•I	 •	 '	 10411	 I See
relativ_es of the deceased, upon a showing that paternity
may be established by the testing of such relatives, If ge-
netic samples from the deceased or his blood relative. are
• '11	 .	 011,A s..5.   14 .	 • • '	 • '
lease for testing,andshall do so before ordering the testing
of the decea,sesliaidativea.aheresultsOf IlleSe_Dt;A,_.teStS
••
	 II	 '1	 •	 •" •	 el •	 r. - • I III	 I..	 IS
reveal information about any party's physical character-
istics, predisposition to certain medical conditions or other
matter, 
In addition, Section 7 of the Uniform Act on Paternity, currently
entitled "Authority for Blood Tests," should be changed as follows:
§ 7. [Authority for Blood and DNA Tests]
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made
by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved may,
or upon motion of any party to the [action] [proceeding]
made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly,
shall order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to
blood or other genetic tests. Jf_the_alleged father is de-
ceased, the court may order DNA testing of his body or 
other
 samples, or of blood relatives of the cieceased. uu on
346
 Underlined text indicates proposed additions to the existing uniform acts.
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a showing_thaLpatenaiw_may  be established by the testing
of_stich relatives If genetic_samples_from the deceased or 
his hlood_relative are store in a DNA database,  the court
may order  their release for testing, and shall do so before 
ordering  the  testing of the deceased's relatives The_results
of these_DNA_tests shall be limited to the question of  pater-
nity and shall not reveal information about any 
 party's
physical characteristics, predisposition to certain medical
conditions or other matters.
 If any party refuses to submit
to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others
and the interests of justice so require.
States that adopted the 1990 version of the Uniform Probate
Code, including the provision for parent and child relationships to be
determined under the Uniform Parentage Act, would not need to
make additional changes.TM 7
 Those that have adopted an earlier version
including specific provisions for paternity determination, or have not
adopted the reference to the Uniform Parentage Act, or have not
adopted the Uniform Probate Code should change their statutes along
the lines outlined above."'
Additionally, Congress should change federal statutes relating to
the proof of paternity. In 1984, Congress responded to the improved
ability of scientific testing to determine paternity and amended the
Social Security Act to require that states pass laws providing for the
establishment of paternity actions at any time prior to the child's
eighteenth birthday to continue receiving Social Security benefits. 849
Congress should respond to recent advances in paternity testing by
explicitly providing for the use of DNA tests to determine paternity for
all federal welfare and benefit programs, rather than relying on state
law methods. 35° States should respond to the accuracy of DNA testing
by adopting the proposed changes where their statutes are based on
the uniform acts, or by adopting similar language where the state has
not adopted one of the uniform acts. The time has come for the law
and the courts to recognize the accuracy of DNA testing in paternity
997 See UNIFORM l'aouvrit CODE § 2-114 (1990).
348 See, e.g., id. 2-109 (1983).
349 Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (1988).
35° Issues surrounding the use of a paternity determination made pursuant to federal benefit
laws to later establish rights under state succession or state benefit laws are outside the scope of
this Note.
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determination and to allow its use in paternity actions, before or after
the putative father's death."'
V. CONCLUSION
No one who has ever thought at all about the relations of science
and government, much less anyone who has experienced part of
them directly, is likely to think that positive conclusions are going
to be either firm or easy to come by. 352
DNA fingerprinting is changing the basic assumptions of paternity
testing. The technique offers a degree of accuracy that reaches a near
statistical certainty that one particular man is the father of a given
illegitimate child. Moreover, highly accurate paternity testing is now
possible even when the putative father is deceased.
As problems of proof and the risk of collusion become historical
footnotes, the only remaining rationale for the denial of intestacy
succession rights to illegitimate children is thus undercut. As a result,
paternity litigation will shift from swearing matches and efforts to
gather secondary evidence of acknowledgment to disputes over access
to DNA samples from the deceased, and over whether the tests were
performed correctly. DNA testing brings its own set of problems and
invites litigation over these issues. The increasing number of illegiti-
mate children in our society, and the expansion of state and federal
benefit programs, provides a large pool of plaintiffs ready to litigate
these issues.
Today, courts are struggling to respond in the face of a technology
that obviates the last remaining justification for many of our intes-
tate succession and benefit statutes. In so doing, they are coming to
conflicting results. Some are using evidence codes or their own inher-
ent power to compensate for legislative inaction; others are decrying
illogical results and calling on the legislatures to act. It is time for our
state and federal legislatures to ensure that our laws respond to the
accuracy and efficiency of DNA tests in proving posthumous paternity.
By acting promptly, they will take a major step' toward fully and finally
providing equal rights and equal protection to illegitimate children.
CHARLES NELSON LE RAY
351 To the extent possible, Congress should require the states to allow the use of DNA testing
in posthumous paternity actions. The federalism concerns surrounding a congressional mandate
that states adopt certain standards for their estate laws are outside the scope of this Note, although
one could argue that Congress has an interest in increasing the availability of estate benefits to
illegitimate children as one way of reducing the children's need for federal benefits.
952 C.P. SNOW, SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT S (1961).
